University of South Carolina

Scholar Commons
Theses and Dissertations
2014

The Effects of Political Control and Institutional Structure on State
Ethics Commissions
William Jonathan Rauh
University of South Carolina - Columbia

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd
Part of the Political Science Commons

Recommended Citation
Rauh, W. J.(2014). The Effects of Political Control and Institutional Structure on State Ethics
Commissions. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/3177

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please
contact digres@mailbox.sc.edu.

The Effects of Political Control and Institutional Structure on State
Ethics Commissions
By
William Jonathan Rauh
Bachelor of Arts
University of South Carolina, 2002
Master of Public Administration
University of South Carolina, 2009
_________________________________________________
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Political Science
College of Arts and Sciences
University of South Carolina
2014
Accepted by:
Mark Tompkins, Major Professor
Neal Woods, Committee Member
Tima Moldogaziev, Committee Member
Xuhong Su, Committee Member
Phil Jos, Committee Member
Lacy Ford, Vice Provost and Dean of Graduate Studies

© Copyright by William Jonathan Rauh, 2014
All Rights Reserved.

ii

Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my brothers Josh and Adam Rauh. Growing up
arguing with you two was good preparation for this.

iii

Acknowledgments
I would like to thank the committee for giving of their time in guiding me
through the dissertation process. I would especially like to thank Mark
Tompkins for his guidance and encouragement. I would like to thank Neal
Woods for his patience as I worked through the theoretical foundations of my
work, and Tima Moldogaziev for his continuing encouragement and assistance
in statistical modelling. I would also like to thank Xuhong Su for her
encouragement and positive support throughout this process. Finally I would
like to thank Phil Jos for helping place work more broadly in the relevant
literature. You have each assisted me in multiple ways and I am grateful for all
you have done. Finally, I would like to thank my parents who taught me the
value of education, but also served as great models for the kind of person I want
to be.

iv

Abstract
State ethics commissions serve as both oversight and enforcement bodies.
However they are also quasi-judicial institutions whose members are appointed
by elected officials. At best this presents problems of oversight, and at worst it
implies that commissions can be actively influenced by the very individuals they
are tasked with overseeing. Previous studies of ethics commissions have
examined the covariates of creating ethics commissions, or have examined the
internal functioning of these commissions in the pursuit of their envisioned
goals. A largely ignored area of study with regard to these commissions is the
degree to which elected officials can exercise influence over members they
appoint and what this says for the effectiveness of these commissions. In this
dissertation I examine how elected officials use their appointment authority over
commissions as a means of political influence. In turn I examine how this
influence manifests itself in terms of a commission’s effectiveness. My findings
indicate that elected officials do in deed use appointment authority as a means of
influence, but this influence manifests itself in very different ways.
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Chapter One: Ethics Commissions: Background and Issues
The Purpose of Ethics Commissions
Over the past 50 years, 41 states have created state ethics commissions to
oversee activities ranging from ensuring that candidates file financial disclosures
and lobbyists register with the state, to providing ethics training to agency heads
and investigating ethics complaints. The popular belief about ethics
commissions that they provide oversight of public and elected officials. Indeed a
whitepaper from the National Council of State Legislatures (Comlossy 2011)
states, “They [ethics commissions] work to ensure voters’ trust in policymakers
and political institutions by monitoring compliance with ethics laws and
ensuring ethical conduct by those under their jurisdiction.” This implies that
commissions serve as the watch dogs for the public - ensuring that conflicts of
interest are exposed, financial dealings are done “in the daylight,” that the
decision-making process is transparent and so on. In practice though, ethics
commissions are primarily compliance organizations that adjudicate previously
set standards for what is acceptable, i.e. compliance organizations (Smith 2003a).
Despite the fact that ethics commissions are mainly compliance
organizations, getting on the bad side of the ethics commission can still cost
1

public officials, both politically and economically. Recently Arkansas Lieutenant
Governor Mark Darr was fined $11, 000 by the Arkansas ethics commission for
misuse of campaign finances in his 2012 election and the Arkansas Governor
Mike Beebe has called on Darr to step down.
Prior to the creation of commissions, states were largely reactive to ethical
lapses, with state attorney general conducting investigations into ethical failings.
With the creation of these commissions the stated intent was to have an
organization that could reinforce public confidence by setting fire alarms for
ethical failings rather than waiting until they became full-blown scandals.
Predictably though there is a short life cycle for this sort of attention. After all,
commissions are empowered both by well-meaning but imperfect individuals,
but also by those will likely be overseen by the commission itself (Lewis and
Gilman 2012; Rosenson 2003). Additionally, the types of ethics regulations that
develop out of these events tend to be untargeted, general, and do not
necessarily address the issue that created the scandal in the first place (see
Anechiarico and Jacobs 1996; Rosenson 2006).
A stated end for these commissions resolving issues of ethics and
accountability was addressing what Lipset and Schneider (1987) refer to as the
confidence gapi – the erosion of public trust in public institutions (see Bowman
1990). According to Lewis and Gilman (2012) the confidence gap began to
2

emerge in the mid-1960s with public disillusion over Vietnam and a generation
that largely felt overlooked by its political leaders. The event that broke open the
flood gates of public distrust though was the Watergate scandal – August 1974.
As a result of this decline in trust in public institutions states took up the mantle
of protectors of democracy and began to empower state ethics commissions.
Although there have been successes, Ethics Commissions have also been
used as a tool of political attack with policies that have resulted in administrative
gridlock (see Rosenson 2006; Tolchin and Tolchin 2001). As noted by Gilman and
Denhardt (2002), often well-meaning individuals attempt to write empowering
regulations that “out-ethics” everyone else, thus leading to either administrative
gridlock, or regulations that address potential charges of quid-pro-quo, but do
not address more nuanced possibilities for corruption such as lax financial
disclosure requirements. These are the sorts of codes that can be Kantian in
nature and treat taking a pen from the agency stockroom as equivalent to
embezzlement (Tolchin and Tolchin 2001), but which do not address things as
simple as requiring elected officials to reveal all of their investments (see
Rosenson 2003; 2006). This creates a situation where elected officials create ethics
commissions that are primarily symbolic in nature. They serve as a symbol of
integrity for public distrust but do not really do much in the way of oversight.
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A good example of ethics policies and ethics commissions being used as
tools of political attack is South Carolina – a state in which the governor appoints
all members of the ethics commission. In 2012 and 2013, South Carolina
politicians engaged in a political fight using the ethics commission as their
weapon of choice. South Carolina Governor Nikki Haley was the target of an
ethics investigation with charges stemming from the state’s General Assembly.
The charges came from allegations made by political foes that she lobbied for
Lexington Hospital (SC) while she was a member of the SC General Assembly,
and that she did not recuse herself from votes that would have benefitted
Lexington Hospital. The commission came to the conclusion that there was
enough evidence to go forward with a prosecution and then summarily
dismissed the case without comment. Following a very public backlash from a
former political supporter turned foe, the case was reopened and went before the
commission where Governor Haley was tried and cleared of all charges. Shortly
after she was cleared, the ethics commission began investigating potential
unethical activities of several of her accusers, including the Speaker of the SC
House of Representatives, Bobby Harrell (Shain 2014). These political “gotcha”
games are fairly common and it is not uncommon to use ethics commissions as
political tools. As an anonymous state legislator put it, ‘if they can’t get you on
policy grounds, they will try to get you on ethics’ (Lewis and Gilman 2912: 253).
4

The public administration literature is replete with discussions and
analysis of the importance of ethics in the public sector. Some of these
discussions are area specific such as finance, personnel, police work, education,
etc. Others are more general, i.e. theoretical discussions around the importance
of ethics and what that means for decision making by public officials (VigodaGadot 2008; Gueras and Garofalo 2002; Denhardt 1988). Most of these studies
emphasize the normative value of ethics such as building ethical capacity in
agencies and how this leads to more favorable outcomes – what Rohr (1989)
terms high road ethics. On the other side of this discussion are the ethics
commissions which can take on high road or low road (compliance) functions.
Scholars such as Lewis and Gilman (2012) argue that any discussion of building
ethical capacity is not useful without first establishing compliance with ethics
regulations in a meaningful and enforceable manner. In this manuscript I
discuss the characteristics of state ethics commissions and the effect politics has
on the ability of ethics commissions to enforce ethics policies.
Despite the stated importance of transparency to the American public
(Bowman 1991; McDougle 2006) the public knows surprisingly little about the
actual goings on of state ethics commissions (Smith 2003a). Both the growing
influence of special interests at the state level as well as the increase in both
corruption and the appearance of corruption have prompted calls for greater
5

ethical oversight. This was noted most recently by the State Integrity
Investigation (2011) which found that all states fell far short of achieving their
stated goals with regard to oversight and curbing corruption. Despite the
existence of commissions and despite the fact that they tend to have similar
stated goals, how they go about their achieving their goals and the regulations
which empower them vary significantly from state to state – see table 1.1.

Structure and Powers of Commissions
Note in table 1.1 that some commissions are labeled as commissions
proper and others are labeled as boards. The distinctions are important for
reasons of enforcement authority and the strength of their decisions. Boards
tend to have appointed heads with fixed terms, fulltime staff to oversee their
activities, and exist as their own budget center. Many of these have legal backing
from the judiciary as well meaning that their decisions are binding in court and
they also possess subpoena powers. Commissions on the other hand tend to
exist as line items in the executive or legislative budgets, have terms that set
renewable, commissioners are not necessarily fulltime, and often require
approval from a committee of elected officials to pursue charges or investigations
(Rosenson 2006).
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Table 1.1. Responsibilities of ethics commissions by state.
Issue
Orders
Conduct Issue
State
Develop Develop
Subpoena
Compliance/Reporting
Advisory Enforceable
Ethics
Annual
Commission/Stature Forms Manuals
Powers
Opinions
in Court
Training Report
Alabama Ethics
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

Alaska Legislative
Ethics Committee

X

X

X

X

X

Alaska Public
Offices Commission

X

X

X

X

X

Arizona
7

Arkansas Ethics
Commission
California Fair
Political Practices
Commission
Colorado
Independent Ethics
Commission
Connecticut Ethics
Commission
Delaware State
Public Integrity
Commission
Florida Commission
on Ethics

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

No ethics commission
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Georgia
Government
Transparency and
Campaign Finance
Commission
Hawaii State Ethics
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Idaho

X

X

X

No ethics commission

Illinois Legislative
Ethics Commission

X

Illinois Office of the
Legislative
Inspector General

X
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Illinois Executive
Ethics Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Illinois Office of the
Executive Inspector
General
Office of the
Indiana Inspector
General and
Indiana State Ethics
Commission
Indiana Lobby
Registration
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Iowa Ethics &
Campaign
Disclosure Board
Kansas
Governmental
Ethics Commission
Kentucky
Legislative Ethics
Commission
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Kentucky Executive
Ethics Commission
Louisiana Board of
Ethics
Maine Commission
on Governmental
Ethics and Election
Practices
Maryland State
Ethics Commission
Massachusetts State
Ethics Commission
Michigan State
Board of Ethics
Minnesota
Campaign Finance
and Public
Disclosure Board

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Mississippi Ethics
Commission
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Missouri Ethics
Commission
Montana
Commissioner of
Political Practices
Nebraska
Accountability and
Disclosure
Commission
Nevada
Commission on
Ethics
New Hampshire
New Jersey State
Ethics Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

No ethics commission
X

X

X

New Mexico

X
No ethics commission

New York State
Joint Commission
on Public Ethics

X

New York State
Legislative Ethics
Commission

X

North Carolina
State Ethics
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

North Dakota
Ohio Ethics
Commission
Oklahoma Ethics
Commission
Oregon
Government Ethics
Commission

No ethics commission
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X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Pennsylvania State
Ethics Commission

X

X

Rhode Island Ethics
Commission

X

South Carolina
Ethics Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

South Dakota

X

No ethics commission

Tennessee Bureau
of Ethics and
Campaign Finance

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Texas Ethics
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Utah Independent
Legislative Ethics
Commission

X

Vermont
Virginia

No ethics commission
No ethics commission

X

Washington State
Legislative Ethics
Board
Washington
Executive Ethics
Board
Washington Public
Disclosure
Commission

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X
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West Virginia Ethics
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
Commission
Wisconsin
Government
X
X
X
X
X
Accountability
Board
Wyoming
No ethics commission
Source: National Council of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-state-ethics-commissionspowers-a.aspx
Note that New Hampshire has an ethics committee made up of elected officials, as do the majority of states; but the focus of
committees tends to be internal.

Note that some states have no commissions. In these states ethical issues are still
addressed by the state’s attorney general, or by a standing ethics committee that
is made up of state legislators. Western states tend not to have ethics
commissions, but also tend to have more rural populations. The lack of
commissions in these states can largely be explained by history and geography
so there is likely not anything about being Western (geographically) that makes
them more prone to not having ethics commissions. These are states that have
historically voted Republican and tend to have low populations relative to the
rest of the country. However cultural and historical features may play a role.
This is likely a niche phenomenon since other western states with the same
traditions do have ethics commissions, e.g. Utah, Montana, Nevada, etc. The
point is this geographic phenomenon, while interesting in its own right, likely
does not provide much in way of generalization about ethics commissions.
Commission Empowerment and Expectations
An important point in the discussion of ethics commissions is their
empowering regulations. First, as Mackenzie (2002) and Rosenson (2006) note,
ethics policies are distinct from other public policies since ethics policies do not
reflect the true preference of policymakers. This is because unlike other policies
such as education policy which target some outside group, ethics policies target
policymakers and require them to submit to external regulations. Second,
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commissioners, like all bureaucrats, act on the basis of statutory authority (Smith
2003a). This includes procedural guidelines such as establishing the bases for
investigations, subpoena powers, and whether the commission’s findings are
legally binding. However, what commissions do may be less important than
how they do it. This is a point made by Smith (2003a) in his examination of the
roles and responsibilities of ethics commissions.
Ethics commissions like other organizations tend to model themselves
after other organizations in their field. However the expectations of these
commissions are reflections of social and cultural expectations of the states in
which they are located (Anechiarico and Jacobs 1994; Anechiarico 2010). While
what is considered a corrupt political practice in South Carolina may be seen as
politics as usual in Massachusetts, the commissions determining what is corrupt
and what is not tend to have similar underlying organizational structures.
Commissions all start with the same general structural framework and then
innovate from there based upon the unique cultural or social expectations of
their states.
Having similar organizational structures but culturally based expectations
creates cross pressures for defining any measurable standard of integrity to point
to as successful ethics enforcement. Having measurable standards of ethicality
or integrity was never the intent of commissions though, so much as reinforcing
14

their legitimacy as organizations. This goes back to the point about overly
general regulations that have no teeth. Often a commission’s empowering
regulations have less to do with whether or not they are proven to reduce
corruption or increase confidence, and more to do with adding legitimacy to the
commission. As DiMaggio and Powell (1983) and Selznick (1996) note, once
structural innovation in an organization reaches beyond a certain threshold, the
organization gains legitimacy by innovating and specializing their structures to
meet expectations even if such spread does nothing to improve performance.
Commissions tend not to be empowered to change ethics policies though, and
ethics policies are debated (by elected officials) less than say education policy or
insurance policy (Mackenzie 2002). As Rosenson (2006) claims that the reason for
this is that unlike other policy types, unlike other policy types ethics policy tends
to focus on elected officials. I should note that this structural norm is not only an
American phenomenon. Since the 1970s nearly every political jurisdiction in
OECD countries has created similar public structures to oversee public integrity
(Anechiarico 2010).

Ethics Commissions Are Not Desirable To Elected Officials
In the United States commissions are empowered as political subdivisions
of state governments. However they do not all take on similar structures – some
are subdivisions of an elected branch with budgets that are a flow-through from
15

the branch’s budget while others are stand-alone agencies with budgets that are
line items in their state’s budget. Given the role of commissions though one is
inclined to ask why political officials would want to empower commissions. As
stated above, the creation of commissions is largely responsive and ethics
policies tend to focus on elected officials. Political officials do not want to give
up authority to unelected officials. As noted by Rosenson (2003) though, they are
more willing to do so under two conditions: (1) when the creation of a
commission does not present an economic or political threat; and (2) when the
cost of doing nothing (and being seen as complacent on corruption) is more
costly than giving up some authority to a commission.
For example, Rosenson (2003; 2005; 2009) demonstrated that legislators are
more likely to empower commissions when they do not perceive them as a threat
to their economic and political interests. Of course her measure is a bit awkward
since she looks at the salaries of legislators as opposed to their net worth. Still
this is an understandable though since access to information on net worth would
presume strong regulations over things like financial disclosures. Even under
her model though, legislators were more likely to pass regulations checking the
governor than checking themselves. This raises a variety of questions as to what
role political power plays in the decisions of these ethics commissions. While
some of these questions involve a variety of normative assumptions about what
16

role commissions should play, I take the position of Lewis and Gillman (2012)
that what Rohr (1989) calls low road ethics (compliance with ethical regulations)
is a necessary antecedent for building ethical capacity. Therefore any discussion
of what commissions normatively should do is premised on their achievement of
low road ethics.

Reducing the Threat from Commissions: Symbolic Institutions?
The implication from all of this, beyond the argument that elected officials
seek to control ethics commission, is that commissions may be more symbolic
than practical. After all this is ultimately a discussion about accountability – the
means by which public and elected officials answer citizens for their use of
power and authority (Lerner and Tetlock 1999). The idea of public organizations
as more symbolic than functional is not a new concept. Edelman (1985: 56)
argues that administrative agencies serve an “expressive function” and provide a
sense of legitimacy to the issues they were designed to address. In the case of
ethics commissions they express the concept of accountability even though it
may not readily be provided, i.e. they are symbols. Smith (2003ab) argues that
while commissions may be symbolic, they also serve multiple roles including
policeman and educator.
In an analysis of ethics complaints filed with the state of Florida, Menzel
(1991) found that the target of an ethics complaint tended to view the decision
17

more negatively when found at fault than a filer of a complaint did when the
target of the complaint was cleared. This was particularly true for elected
officials, and a basic understanding campaign politics would dictate why – even
though one may be cleared of an ethics charge, it still provides ammunition that
can be used against an elected official in future elections. After all, the scandal
may die down but can always be brought back to life once it is on the record.
Elected officials face the problem of appointed commissioners with the
ability to censure or otherwise threaten them face an uncertain set of choices
(McCubbins 1989; White 1985). One set of choices involves outcomes that can be
harmful to the elected official (Mitnick 1992). If this is the case then if one
assumes that elected officials are rational, or even politically sophisticated, then
they should seek to mitigate potential threats through their choice of whom they
appoint and therefore through the amount of influence they have at their
disposal. This is essentially a problem of selection. Elected officials cannot
perfectly observe the actions of the commissioners, who are primarily political
appointees. As such, elected officials seek to mitigate the potential risk posed by
commissioners by appointing individuals who are friendly to their positions or
party, are easily influenced, etc.
The idea of elected officials as having a stake in an ethics commission
assumes that there is some level of control over the commissions’ activities.
18

However it also assumes that there is some benefit to be gained from the
commission’s activities (Stout 2007; Stout and Blair 2001). One obvious benefit to
elected officials is avoiding strict oversight. Another benefit is provided when
someone is cleared by an ethics commission – e.g. Nikki Haley, or the even more
preferred option – when the commission fails to take action. Still other benefits
can be provided enforcing obvious and blatant ethics violations, such as quidpro-quo relationships, but not requiring elected officials to do a full disclosure of
their finances. Likewise, an individual may ask the ethics commission to review
a desired course of action. If this action is cleared then it can provide cover
against future charges of unethical behavior and in some states can even provide
legal cover (Rosenson 2006; Anechiarico 2010). If one assumes that elected
officials use their appointment or removal power to influence commissions, it is
easy to think ethics commissions’ failings as the result of political influence
rather than of culture or internal organizational pressures.

Appointment powers give those elected officials with appointment
powers a great deal of power over the commission; but so does the threat of
removal. They may utilize their appointment power, or removal power to make
life difficult for commissioners who do not side with them. A good example of
this is the case of Teddy Lee. Teddy Lee was appointed by to a five year term by
Democratic Governor Zell Miller in 1991. He was reappointed by Miller again in
19

1996 and again by Democratic Governor Roy Barnes in 2001 – this time as
Commissioner. In 2002 Sonny Perdue (R) won election to the Governor’s office
and the Republicans took control of the General Assembly. With staggered
terms, by 2006 Teddy Lee was the last Democratic appointee left on the
Commission. By all accounts, Teddy Lee was not liked by the Georgia political
establishment. He went after Democrats and Republicans alike. He fined both
Vernon Jones (CEO of Dekalb County and Democratic financier) and Republican
Governor Sonny Perdue for campaign finance violations. In 2006 a new lobbyist
oversight law banned campaign fundraising while the General Assembly was in
session. To help with enforcement the General Assembly gave the commission’s
budget an additional 68% ($608,000 in 2011 dollars). Commissioner Lee used
that additional funding to make financial disclosures available on the General
Assembly’s website. Both the GOP led General Assembly and the Republican
Governor urged him to remove it. When he refused the commission voted 4-1 to
remove Lee, prior to the end of his five year term. They also removed the web
access to financial disclosures from the General Assembly’s website. Although
neither Sonny Perdue nor the GA state legislature directly fired Teddy Lee, his
firing served their interests.
A key point about appointment power in this regard is that when this
power is concentrated in the hands of fewer individuals, those individuals likely
20

have more power over appointees. This follows Moe and Bendor’s (1985)
conception of committee and appointment power as a means of bureaucratic
control. When we consider this in terms of commissions though, we must ask if
the ability to exercise this sort of control is a normatively good thing, especially
considering the stated purpose of commissions.
This is a sticky question given the stated mission of commissions because
it envisions a fine line between control of the bureaucracy and potential
corruption. Consider this in the abovementioned case of Nikki Haley. She
exercised her legitimate authority as the sole appointer and remover for the
ethics commission; in doing so though she obviously provided a benefit to
herself. Moreover she, anecdotally at least, appears to have used that authority
against political rivals. In an effort to have the commission find in her favor, the
Governor publicly announced that she would implicate members of the
commission in similar dealings if she was found guilty (Smith 2012). There are
two points to consider here: first is that the nature of commission activities
makes them distinct from other bureaucratic organizations; second is that
because of this political control over these organizations must be thought of
differently than political control over other organizations.
Empowerment is one thing, but no one wants to be the target of an ethics
commissions; even if one is not found at fault their reputation can still be
21

damaged. As a result empowering a commission with oversight authority is
often just lip service and the commission does not have real authority to target
those who empowered it. In many cases legislatures will empower commissions
with oversight authority, but direct all of that oversight towards the governor.
The public tends to be ill informed about politics in general so they may never
know that the legislature created an ethics commission but only empowered it to
investigate the governor. As a result they may take the creation of a commission
as equivalent to oversight. In the scenario the creation of a commission really
amounts to nothing more than a symbol of integrity. As Niemi, Stanley and
Vogel (1995) note, the governor is already the most visible member of state
government. More commissions have oversight of the governor than over the
legislature (39 for the Governor versus 32 for the legislature). Of these, only 23
have oversight over both the governor and the legislature. Then there are five
states with separate commissions for the governor and legislature. However
from the distribution of oversight authority one can see there tends to be more
emphasis on the governor than the legislature. This does not mean that
governors are simply punching bags for the legislature when it comes to ethics.
Governors also enjoy appointment authority over the ethics commission and in
many cases the budget of the ethics commission is simply a line item in the
executive office’s budget.
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The scenarios above paint a picture where commissions are either a tool
for elected officials to offer a symbol of integrity to the masses. They are used by
legislatures to check the governor, and in turn, given appointment powers, or are
intentionally weakened by the governor. Of course it is incorrect to assume that
all commissions are ineffectual or just engage in check box compliance. The
power to appoint commissioners differs from state to state as does the control of
a commission’s budget. In Connecticut the governor appoints three of nine
members with the other six appointed by the speaker, president pro tempore,
and the minority and majority leaders in both houses. By contrast in South
Carolina the governor appoints all commissioners and there is no requirement
for senate confirmation.
In all states commissioners generally appointed by political actors with
varying degrees of checks on who sits on the commission, e.g. some commissions
are appointed entirely by the governor (South Carolina) whereas others have
more diffuse appointments involving multiple members of the legislature and
the executive branch (Washington). Along with variations in appointment
authority to ethics commissions, as political entities the make-up of ethics
commissions varies as do the targets of their regulations.
From the outset I claimed, as have others, that commissions may simply
be a symbol of integrity for social and cultural expectations. Edelman (1985) calls
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this political symbolism. This language has also been used by Smith (2003) in
describing the roles of commissions. Symbolism as used by Edelman can mean
positive or negative. Positive symbolism would imply that a commission exists
as an aspirational entity – something which others should strive towards.
Negative symbolism implies that a commission exists primarily for appearance,
or as I claim, as a symbol of integrity. Smith (2003a) as well as his interview
subjects rejected the negative view of symbolism outright. Their reason for
doing this was that the fines and ability of commissions to harm elected officials
electorally is very real, therefore commissions must necessarily be for more than
just show. It is true that commissions can harm elected officials but to claim that
the ability to harm is the one thing that means commissions are not negative
symbols ignores the political and institutional realities of commissions.
Commissions can harm political officials. However commissions are
empowered by elected officials, and typically when it is not painful to do so
(Rosenson 2003; 2005; 2009). Additionally, commissioners are appointed by
elected officials and therefore the appointing officials are likely to maintain some
form of influence over their appointees. It is possible then that elected officials
use this influence to avoid the harm that may be levied by commissions, or to
direct the harm towards political rivals. Therefore it does not make a lot of sense
to claim the ability to harm the thing that makes commissions positive symbols.
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This is because the ability of commissions to harm elected officials is the very
reason that elected officials seek to influence commissions. And, in seeking to
influence commissions the ability of commissions to carry out their objectives –
and by doing so to harm elected officials – is dampened. Therefore a necessary
condition for claiming that a commission is not-negatively-symbolic is the
exercise of the ability to harm is exercised despite political influence.

My Contribution
As Lewis and Gilman (2012: 195) note, “even the best of codes is not
substitute for good people.” The reasons for this seem pretty straightforward
when we recognize the ability of these commissions to exercise administrative
discretion. But this also creates a dilemma that has been hinted at by others but
never fully explored. If commissions and agencies are in place to ensure the
public trust by overseeing elected officials, then how well can they actually
achieve this when those appointed for this task are appointed by the very people
they are tasked with overseeing?
This is the topic that I wish to address in this dissertation. I explore how,
and to what degree elected officials wield political influence over ethics
commissions. In turn I examine how that influence manifests itself in terms of
the effectiveness of ethics commissions. My argument goes that elected officials
control the institutional make-up of the commission via their ability to appoint
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commissioners. In doing this they can exert political influence over commissions
to either evade scrutiny of their own activities, or to direct greater attention at
their rivals.
I examine the question of if and how political actors influence ethics
commissions. Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation I examine:
(1) if and how elected officials exercise their influence over commissions? And (2)
whether this influence translates into meaningful differences in the enforcement
of ethics policies?

I examine these questions through the lens of bureaucratic

autonomy, i.e. does the ability of elected officials to control the capacity of a
commission to act, and the structural independence of a commission affect
perceived political influence over ethics commission. This perspective suggests
that because ethics commissions can be harmful to elected officials, they use their
appointment authority as a means of influencing commissions. In my work I
find mixed support for this perspective with the legislature demonstrating fewer
attempts at political influence than the governor.
In making my argument I examine political influence as a means of
controlling commissions via resources and structure. In my arguments I show
that while traditional notions of controlling the bureaucracy apply to ethics
commissions, given the capacity of commissions to embarrass or otherwise harm
elected officials, arguments for how autonomy manifests itself on a commission,
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and how elected officials seek to limit that autonomy, must be expanded from
traditional notions. To do this I argue that the ability of ethics commissions to
occupy either the role of high road arbiter of ethical capacity, or low road
regulator of ethical compliance is determined by the political realities used to
empower ethics commissions. As Lewis and Gilman (2012) claim though, high
road ethics are not possible without first addressing low road compliance. I
examine the capacity of commissions to achieve this low road standard by
looking at how appointment power over ethics commissions affects political
influence on commissions. It is my perspective that elected officials recognize
that commissions can threaten them both politically and economically, and
therefore they are not willing to cede too much power to these unelected
commissions to raise red flags about the behavior of elected officials. In turn
though this is a limiting factor for the traditional autonomy literature which
considers fire alarms as the means by which elected officials monitor the
bureaucracy. After all an elected official is not likely to consider an alarm about
an ethics commission not sounding an alarm on their behavior as a desirable
means of limiting the commission’s autonomy. Instead they are likely to rely on
their ability to control the commission’s capacity and independence as a means
of controlling the commission’s autonomy. Thereby they avoid the risk of public
outcry against weak ethics policies which would likely result in more regulation.
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Chapter Two: The State Integrity Investigation
About the Investigation
In polls of likely voters respondents tell pollsters that integrity is the
primary quality they look for in public officials (Fourier and Tompson 2007).
However many public officials fall short of this ideal and moreover much of the
public has no clue. For example in New York Governor Andrew Cuomo
established the Moreland Commission to investigate corruption in the state
legislature, however when the investigation began to dig up skeletons in his own
closet he sought to deter the investigation (Craig, Rashbaum and Kaplan 2014).
The stated purpose of the State Integrity Investigation (SII) was to identify
practices in states that reinforce as well as undermine public trust and to then
rank states on their risks of corruption. The survey was unprecedented in its
scope – covering all 50 states with a 330 question survey of experienced political
reporters. Seasoned journalists graded each state government on its corruption
risk using 330 specific questions across 14 categories, including legislative and
executive accountability, ethics laws, lobbying regulations, and management of
state insurance departments.
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The Goals of the State Integrity Investigation
The State Integrity Investigation has three stated goals:


To examine states’ commitment to government integrity and shine
light on what’s working and what’s not.



To convince state officials to improve their laws and practices. The
State Integrity Index highlights “best practices” in state
government and can serve as a basis for policy reforms that address
the unique challenges facing each state.



To inspire the public to become interested and invested in ensuring
honest, effective state government. The Investigation offers many
ways for people to become involved – following news about state
integrity, emailing report cards to officials, sharing experiences
with state government, proposing solutions, and connecting with
local “good government” groups. (State Integrity Investigation
2012).

Survey Methodology
The Investigation researched a list of 330 statements about the laws and
practices that promote open, accountable state government and deter corruption.
We call these statements Corruption Risk Indicators, and they are organized into
14 areas of state government oversight. Reporters scored each response on
ordinal or binomial scales. Ordinal scales were used for questions of “practice”
and binomial scales were used for questions of “in law.” For example:
•

In law, lobbyists are required to file a registration form. (0=No; 1=Yes)

•

In practice, citizens can access lobbying disclosure documents at a
reasonable cost. (0,25,50,75,100; Strongly Disagree – Strongly Agree).
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"In law" indicators provide an objective assessment of whether certain legal
codes, fundamental rights, government institutions, and regulations exist. For
each of the “in law” responses a reporter had to provide the statute(s) which
backed up their claim.
"In practice" indicators address issues such as implementation, enforcement and
citizen access (State Integrity Investigation 2012). The scoring methodology using
100, 50, and 0 scores with 25 and 75 deliberately left undefined to serve as inbetween scoring options. In only a few cases, the “in practice” indicators are
scored with “yes” or “no.” For a response to be accepted, a reporter had to
provide at least two published examples to serve as exemplars of the practice
being effective, implemented, etc. These included a website link to a relevant
report, a specific piece of a statute that was not being enforced (or was enforced)
and examples thereof, or specific state and federal reports addressing the
questions at hand. Additionally, the reporters were able to include supplemental
information to support their score. This helped in vetting responses since the
“yes, but…” response arose for many of these questions.
These questions were broken out into 61 subcategories and 14 categories.
The ordinal and binomial responses were averaged to create the subcategory
scores, and the subcategory scores were averaged to create category scores. In
turn these category scores were averaged to create the final scores for each state.
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While this ranking methodology is flawed beyond the subcategory level because
error variance increases with each incremental averaging, the only variables I use
as dependent variables in my subsequent models are individual questions and
subcategory scores. As demonstrated in later chapters, these measures and the
models used to estimate them are reliable and robust.
Vetting Responses
The SII researchers worked with the reporters to ensure the validity of responses.
All initial responses were blindly reviewed by a second reporter from each state.
These reporters were tasked with identifying the responses as inaccurate,
inconsistent, or biased. When discrepancies were identified the researchers at
Global Integrity and the Center for Public Integrity served as intermediaries
between the reporters and peer reviewers to resolve questions and come to a
final agreed upon score.
Reporters were required to provide multiple references to substantiate
each of their scores. This could be an interview conducted with a knowledgeable
individual, a website link to a relevant report, or the name of a specific law or
institution, depending on the particular indicator. Reporters had the opportunity
to include additional comments to support their score. Their comments help
capture the nuances of a particular situation, namely the "Yes, but…"
phenomenon which is often the reality in undertaking this type of research.
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Specific Questions from the State Integrity Investigation
The questions used in this dissertation as dependent variables come
directly from the SII. These questions are:
Table 2.1. Dependent Variable for Chapter Three
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies
tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are protected
from political interference.
Strongly Agree
8 (19.5%)
Agree
16 (39.0%)
Neither Agree nor Disagree
10 (24.4%)
Disagree
4 (9.6%)
Strongly Disagree
3 (7.3%)

Table 2.2. Dependent Variables for Chapter Four
Question
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch
(defined here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials) effective?
Are regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the state
legislature effective?

m(sd)
48.900
(17.851)
31.751
(14.843)

Each of these questions is used to capture a specific concept that I seek to
model in my subsequent chapters. For example, the question in table 2.1 is used
as a proxy for how much autonomy a commission enjoys; and the questions in
table 2.2 are used as estimates of the effectiveness of specific ethics regulations.
The use of these measures and the explanatory variables used to model them are
explained in greater detail in the subsequent chapters.

32

Access to State Integrity Investigation data is available at
http://www.stateintegrity.org/corruption_risk_index_raw_data and questions
about the survey may be directed to nkusnetz@publicintegrity.org.
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Chapter Three: Ethics Commissions and Autonomy: How
Independent are They?
Introduction
Political influence over ethics commissions is an important topic in
thinking about the legitimacy of these commissions. However political influence
over ethics commissions presents some sticky problems for the current literature
on bureaucratic autonomy. No bureaucracy has the authority to make its own
mandate, but it is important that some have greater autonomy than others. Ethics
commissions do not usually regulate the providers of public goods or other
private entities; instead, they target elected and public officials, i.e., those who
make public policy. Therefore it is desirable that ethics commissions have broad
mandates; have the authority, funding, and capacity to accomplish those
mandates; and be able to do so without ex ante or ex post pressure from elected
officials.

Commissions are politically empowered institutions that have a
responsibility to monitor those who empower them. This power and the ability
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of commissions to harm elected officials both economically and politically may
give elected officials an incentive to exert control over ethics commissions.

Constituencies expect ethics commissions to provide oversight of their
public and elected officials. A whitepaper of the National Council of State
Legislatures (Comlossy 2011) states that ethics commissions “…work to ensure
voters’ trust in policymakers and political institutions by monitoring compliance
with ethics laws and ensuring ethical conduct by those under their jurisdiction.”
Commissions serve as watch dogs for the public; they ensure that conflicts of
interest are exposed, financial dealings are done “in the daylight,” and the
decision-making process is transparent. In practice, however, ethics commissions
are primarily compliance organizations that set minimum standards for what is
acceptable (Smith 2003a).

Most commissions lack strong mandates, but also can only interpret what
is ethical according to set rules and guidelines. Ethics commissions and most
ethics policies have been born of scandals (Rosenson 2003)—the trend of creating
state ethics commissions can be traced to Watergate. Ethics policies therefore
tend to be responsive and not reflect the true preferences of electd officials (see
Mackenzie 2002; Rosenson 2006; Anechiarico 2008). Because of these factors,
ethics commission mandates generally are not well defined and usually target
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popular notions of corruption, such as quid-pro-quo, while failing to address more
nuanced indicators of corruption, such as strong financial disclosure
requirements for elected officials (Rosenson 2006; Tolchin and Tolchin 2001). This
failure is antithetical to the strong legal mandate that others claim is so important
for autonomy (Carpenter 2001; Fukuyama 2009).

Below I address the question of how elected officials seek to influence
commissions. I draw primarily on two theories of how bureaucratic autonomy is
manifested – principal-agent theory and issues of organizational capacity. This
manuscript proceeds by addressing the purpose and creation of ethics
commissions, a discussion of why and how elected officials would seek to
influence commissions, followed by my hypotheses, model, and findings.

The Purpose and Creation of Ethics Commissions
The majority of ethics commissions have their start with the Watergate
scandal (Rosenson 2003). Even today, in states with ethics commissions new
ethics regulations tend to follow visible and public scandals (Stapenhurst, 2004;
Rosenson, 2003; and Goodman, Holp and Ludwig, 1996). After Speaker of the
House Jim Black was convicted of federal corruption charges in 2007, for
example, North Carolina passed some of the most restrictive lobbying laws in the
country (Kies 2012).
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Although there have been successes in combatting corruption, ethics
commissions have also been used as a tool of political attack and have often
resulted in administrative gridlock. Gilman and Denhardt (2002) note that often
well-meaning individuals will attempt to write empowering regulations that
“out-ethics” everyone else, thus leading to either administrative gridlock, or
regulations that address potential charges of quid-pro-quo, but do not address
more nuanced possibilities for corruption such as lax financial disclosure
requirements. These are the sorts of codes that can be Draconian in nature and
treat taking a pen from the agency stockroom as equivalent to embezzlement
(Tolchin and Tolchin 2001), but which do not address things as simple as
requiring elected officials to reveal all of their investments (see Rosenson 2003;
2006). This creates a situation where elected officials create ethics commissions
that are primarily symbolic in nature. They serve as a palliative for public
distrust, but do not really do much in the way of oversight.
Limiting a Commission’s Autonomy
Elected officials face the problem of an appointed ethics commission with
the ability to censure or otherwise harm them. Therefore, barring some form of
control over the commission, elected officials would face an uncertain set of
outcomes regarding the commission’s ability to harm them politically or
economically. If one assumes that elected officials are rational, or even politically
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sophisticated, then they should seek to mitigate potential threats by exerting
some form of control over the types of actions a commission can take and how it
can go about enforcing ethics policies.
The above is a discussion of why elected officials would seek to influence
commissions, but it does not provide a logic of how. In considering how elected
officials influence commissions I attempt to link the literature on ethics
commissions with the literature on bureaucratic autonomy to develop a theory
about how and when we would expect commissions to have greater autonomy. I
claim that elected officials seek to control the capacity of commissions to act and
also seek to control the structural independence of commissions.

Bureaucratic Autonomy and Ethics Commissions
Autonomy of Ethics Commissions

A variety of theoretical perspectives have been used to explain
bureaucratic autonomy. Fukuyama (2013: 10) conceptualizes bureaucratic
autonomy as, “the notion that bureaucrats themselves can shape goals and
define tasks independently of the wishes of the principals.” Others, including
Rotberg (2014) consider bureaucratic autonomy as the development and use
internal capacity and resources without mediation from political institutions.
Even scholars who consider autonomy from the principal-agent perspective note
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the need to examine an agency’s capacity (Hammond and Knott 1996; Whitford
2005).

The principal-agent approach tends to focus on the relationships between
politicians as elected officials and bureaucrats as the implementers of their
policies. Within this relationship the principal directs the agent by mandating a
goal, but at times also mandating how to achieve that goal; for example,
increasing confidence in political institutions by requiring disclosure of all
financial interests. Autonomy from this perspective is then understood as the
degree to which the agent can direct its own goals or decide on its own methods
for achieving goals absent direction from the principal. A completely
autonomous bureaucracy, under this construct, receives no mandates
whatsoever while a fully non-autonomous bureaucracy is micromanaged by the
political principal (Fukuyama 2013).

The capacity approach addresses how bureaucrats use the variety of
resources and tools at their disposal to achieve their mandates or implement
policies. Capacity is an important prerequisite for autonomy. As Krause
(2009:18) notes, “even well-intentioned institutions lacking sufficient capacity are
incapable of making credible policy commitments.” Additionally, Huber and
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McCarty (2004) find that even when agencies are equally competent, those with
less capacity are less autonomous.

From the previous literature it is easy to claim that ethics commissions are
often not autonomous (Smith 2003ab; Rosenson 2003; 2006). In her 2003 work
Rosenson showed that elected officials are more likely to empower ethics
commissions when they do not perceive them as a threat to their economic
wellbeing. Further, Smith (2003 ab) showed that although ethics commission
staffs would like to engage in more training, investigation and enforcement
activities, they are often hamstrung by a lack of financial and staffing resources.
Rosenson’s (2003; 2006) arguments are based in the belief that elected officials
have little incentive to provide commissions with a high level of autonomy.
Smith’s (2003a; 2003b) arguments rest in the belief that for as much as the public
states they want ethical elected officials (see Bowman 1991), actually enforcing
ethics or building ethical capacity tend to be primarily symbolic exercises (see
also Morgan and Reynolds 1997; Tolchin and Tolchin 2001).

In examining a commission’s autonomy I test several expectations from
both the principal-agent and capacity approaches. To test these expectations I
conceptualize autonomy on an ethics commission as (1) having freedom from
political interference and (2) having the resources necessary achieve its goals.
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These are standard conceptualizations of autonomy in much of the literature –
see Moe (1993), Christensen (2001), Rotberg (2014) and Araral (2009). Given that
ethics investigations can be politically damaging to elected officials, and ethics
convictions even more damaging, elected officials have an incentive to keep a
commission’s level of autonomy in check1. Although there is little incentive to
provide autonomy, some autonomy must be present otherwise the commissions
would be commissions in name only meaning that the threat from the
commission would not really exist2.

To explain how autonomy is manifested I draw on the principal-agent and
capacity approaches. From the principal agent approach I examine the ability of
elected officials to control appointments to a commission and the commission’s
budget as explanations for a lack of freedom from political interference. From
the literature on organizational capacity I consider a commission’s financial
resources and its staffing resources as explanatory factors for a lack of freedom
from political interference.

On a side note, new ethics standards tend to follow scandal, but these standards tend
to be reactive, overly general, and poorly written, i.e. they address obvious issues of
corruption such as quid-pro-quo but tend not to be policies designed to prevent
corruption such as strong financial disclosure provisions – see Mackenzie (2002) and
Tolchin and Tolchin (2001).
2 There is a body of literature from Mackenzie (2002); Rosenson (2006); Bradbury (2007);
and Tolchin and Tolchin (2001; 2010) which addresses the specifics of how and to what
ends commissions are empowered, but I do not address these specifics here since my
focus is on the commission’s autonomy
1
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Appointment and Budget Independence under Principal-Agent Theory

A key assumption under principal-agent theory is that one actor (the
principal) issues directives which are then executed by another set of actors (the
agent(s)) (Waterman and Meier 1998; Moran and Weingast 1984; Baumgartner
2010). Some including Wood and Waterman (1991)3 have argued that a primary
mechanism for control is appointing administrators who are sympathetic to the
positions of the elected branch. It is within these frameworks that I approach
autonomy within principal-agent theory, i.e. that elected official’s ability to
appoint the member of the ethics commission affects their ability to wield
political influence over the commission; and further that a principal’s ability to
control the agent’s finances also serves as a means of control.

Appointment Power

It is hard to imagine that a politician would willingly appoint an
individual who is antagonistic towards them. After all, if the ethics commission
focus is on policymakers, why would the policymakers appoint someone they
knew would seek to harm them? Instead it is more logical to assume that the
more control an elected official has over who sits on the ethics commission, the

3

Wood and Waterman made several arguments about means through which elected officials can
control the bureaucracy including changing budgets, legislative signaling, and administrative
reorganization, but that appointment was the most important means of control.
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more they will be able to influence that individual. The literature on the role of
appointment power and bureaucratic autonomy speaks to this. For example
Moe (1985) argues that elected officials seek to make the bureaucracy more
responsive by increasing the number of administrative positions occupied by
appointees. Wilson (1989) also claims that as appointees bureaucratic agents face
greater pressure to respond favorably to political principals. Further, Hammond
and Knott (1996), Snyder and Weingast (2000) and Epstein and O’Halloran4
(1999) explored political principals’ use of appointments to achieve there desired
ends and found that the ability to appoint was critical to achieving desired policy
outcomes under a variety of conditions, including carrying out the policy beyond
the political life of the appointing authority. This makes sense when it comes to
ethics commissions then if one thinks about Rosenson’s (2003) arguments.
Elected officials may empower commissions when they do not perceive that the
commission will be a threat. However institutions change, so rather than a oneoff concern about the threat posed by commissions to immediate wellbeing,
appointment authority may be seen as a way of ensuring that commissions do
not become a threat later on.

4

Appointment power was considered important for the bureaucracy although the full study was
dedicated to the question of “who” gets authority delegated to them (courts, state actors, local
actors, independent commissions, regulatory agencies) and what level of authority does the
principal retain over these actors.
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Of course states vary based on how much appointment authority any
individual, or set of individuals, has over appointing commissioners. Therefore
the ability of elected officials to influence a commissioner, or appoint individuals
friendly to their position, is likely conditioned on how much authority that
individual had over the appointment. Appointment authority can vary based
upon how many commissioners a single individual can appoint. For example if
the governor can appoint three people to a five person commission and the
President Pro Tempore and Speaker of the House can each appoint one then this
likely means the governor has more influence over the commission than the
Speaker or President Pro Tempore. However appointment authority can also be
checked procedurally through things like confirmation requirements. In a case
where there are no confirmation requirements the appointing individual is likely
more able to appoint their most preferred person to a commissioner’s post. When
there are confirmation requirements they may have to temper their position.

Removal Power

While appointment of commissioners may ex ante influence, removal
power represents hard ex post influence. While it may be difficult to conceive of
an elected official appointing individuals they knew would harm them, it is
important for them to have the threat of removal to ensure that their influence
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over the individual can be maintained (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999).
Appointment authority allows an elected official to decrease the odds of the
commission implementing ethics policies that are harmful to them. If the
commissioner were to go native though (Kingdon 1995) then removal power can
be a hedge to ensure that members of the commission remain friendly or
otherwise easily influenced. Canes-Wrone, Howell and Lewis (2008) and Epstein
and O’Halloran (1999) claim that appointment power is essentially useless
without the power to remove.

Like appointment authority the power to remove commissioners varies
from state-to-state. Some states allow removal of a commissioner without cause;
some require that cause be shown but do not define what constitutes cause; still
others allow removal only for specific violations such as the commission of a
felony. Given what is known about removal power and autonomy in the
traditional bureaus removal power is also likely an important factor in the
autonomy of ethics commission, again because ethics policies constitute a set of
policies that elected officials would not subject themselves to if they had their
most preferred position.
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Budget Independence

Even though ethics commissions collect fines, they tend to not be selffunding organizations. Additionally, effective enforcement/collection of fines
presumes that ethics commissions are effective which would in turn presume
that elected officials are not influencing them. Rather, ethics commissions are
funded in one of two ways, either as a flow through of the budget of one of the
elected branches, or as line items in the state budget. Given that elected officials
have no incentive to ensure an autonomous commission (Mackenzie 2002), it
seems that if they desired to influence the commissions that they could do so
more easily the more control they have over the commission’s budget.

According to Behn (2003) elected officials may seek to control budgets
because budgets reflect an organization’s priorities. If budgets reflect priorities
and also affect the ability of a commission to behave autonomously (Carpenter
2001; Bendor and Moe 1985; Wood 1988) then the ability of a commission to
request and control its own budget should be an important determinant of that
autonomy. The ability to control one’s own budget is important because
controlling one’s budget allows one to control priorities. It is likely that this
ability is of great important on ethics commissions, if one remembers that elected
officials do not have an incentive to provide a commission with a high degree of
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autonomy. Bendor and Moe (1985: 772) have an excellent quote which reflects
why this is case, “Although bureaus can sometimes move to a paradise of
exploding budgets and slack, they cannot do so when checked by even a
primitive form of legislative oversight…” It seems then that if elected officials
have desire to influence their ethics commission, then a good way to do it is by
ensuring that the commissions do not have control over their own budget.

As an example, in states such as Maryland and Michigan the budget of the
ethics commission is simply a flow-through from the budget allocated to office of
the executive. On Alaska’s Legislative Ethics Commission, the budget is a flowthrough of the budget allocated to paying for legislative staff, expenses, etc.
Likewise Alaska’s more general Public Offices Commission which covers the
executive and executive agencies, is a flow-through of the budget allocated to the
executive. Having the monitored branch responsible for controlling the funds of
the body doing the monitored seems substantively different than situations
where the budget of the commission is a line item. Take for example states like
Connecticut or Maine where the commission’s budget is a line item for an
independent agency.

47

Organizational Capacity and Ethics Commissions

Organizational capacity is critical for an organization’s autonomy
(Yesilkagit 2004; Rotberg 2014; Carpenter 2001). No doubt organizations with
more resources are able to exercise more autonomy (e.g. Huber and McCarty
2004). Smith (2003a) and Morgan and Reynolds (1997) argue that the
effectiveness of ethics commissions is at least partly dependent upon the capacity
of staff to carry out mandates including education, filing reports, and developing
manuals but enforcement and investigation actions may be secondary to these
activities. Additionally Smith (2003a) and Herman (1997) both note that more
effective ethics commissions tend to have greater financial capacity. Given these
findings I examine capacity in terms of financial capacity and staffing capacity,
two areas that are often noted in the literature on organizational capacity, but
also areas closely related to organizational capacity such as resource dependence.

Financial Capacity

It is generally accepted that when agencies have more financial resources
with which to accomplish their goals then they have greater autonomy (e.g.
Pfeffer and Salancik 2003; Sharfman et al, 1988; Malatesta and Smith 2011). As it
pertains to ethics commissions specifically, Herman (1997) and Smith (2003a)
both note that commissions are under great stress to meet their administrative
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requirements with limited resources; this in turn may limit their abilities to carry
out investigations and enforcement actions. For example, commissions are
required to create and file documents, create annual reports, engage in
educational activities, and so on, but also engage in investigations and
enforcement actions.

Smith (2003a) examined three state ethics commissions (CT, NY and FL)
and noted that although the commissions satisfied their mandates for filing and
accepting forms from elected and public officials, they only had the financial
resources to conduct serious reviews of 5 – 10% of these forms. He also found
that the ethics commissions that were viewed as the most effective were those
with the most capacity to engage in activities such as investigations or
substantive review of disclosure forms. As noted above though, most
commissions lacked the resources to engage in meaningful reviews or to conduct
serious investigations. Both Smith (2003a) and Herman (1997) note that an
increase in financial capacity would be necessary for the commissions to
overcome these stresses.

In examining financial capacity it is necessary to take two things into
account: first is what the commissions must accomplish, i.e. what is the
commission tasked with doing; second is how much budget the commissions
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have to accomplish these tasks. A commission’s tasks include things such as
developing forms and manuals, compiling annual reports, and of course ethics
investigations (refer back to table 1.1).

In a previous review of ethics commission activities Morgan and Reynolds
(1997) concluded that ethics commissions dedicated much of their financial
resources to what were ostensibly paper pushing exercises, i.e. creating new
forms and emphasizing superficial norms of propriety. A unifying thread
running through the literature cited above is, given their levels of financing,
many ethics commissions are forced to trade-off investigations and enforcement
actions for administrative goals. Morgan and Reynolds (1997) went further than
Smith (2003a) in claiming that even meeting those administrative goals was only
possible a superficial level – certainly not at a level that would imply the
commissions were acting autonomously. Additionally, findings from the 2012
State Integrity Investigation suggest that when it comes to meeting their
administrative requirements, Morgan and Reynolds’ (1997) harsher
interpretation was likely correct. In many states forms were left unfiled, reviews
of statements of financial interest were years behind and received only cursory
reviews – hardly a picture of a commission with the capacity to act
autonomously.
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Personnel Capacity

My concern with staffing capacity is the ability of the day-to-day staff to
address the commission’s goals. Specifically I measure the number of staff the
commission has available relative to the duties that staff must accomplish. It is
known that commissions differ widely in how much staff they dedicate to
achieving their goals. For example, ethics staff in Connecticut lamented that they
did not have enough staff to do meaningful ethics trainings, but instead were
forced to rely on large conferences. The Florida commission was forced to
contract out its ethics training because they simply did not have the staff to
sufficiently meet its mandate (see Smith 2003a). This is no small matter since
previous studies have shown that as staffing resources dedicated to combatting
ethics violations increase so too do corruption convictions (see Mackenzie 2002).
The stated reason for this is that the staff had more time to dedicate to pursuing
leads and investigating suspicious or incomplete disclosures.

In an analysis of different cross-state surveys (Smith 2003a) and a review
of five years of literature Menzel (2007), results indicate that employees of ethics
commissions have a desire to pursue the commission’s goals to greater levels
than the current staffing capacity allows. Employees noted that they were
hamstrung by the need to satisfy multiple requirements such as annual reporting
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or forms filings while lacking sufficient staff to engage in other activities such as
training or enforcement. This was true both for administrative activities as well
as investigations (see Smith 2003a).

Some have considered the professionalization of a staff as a way of
explaining autonomy. Staff size is typically used as one factor in
professionalization along with other factors such as salary or length of term.
However previous studies at the state level have shown that with the exception
of staff size these other factors are not strong explanatory factors for variation of
ethics enforcement between states (see Goodman, Holp and Ludwig 1997;
Menzel 2005; Smith 2003a).

Different bureaucracies have differing degrees of control over the size of
their staff (see Boyne, Jenkins and Poole 1999). Ethics commissions do not have a
great deal of sway over how much staff they have5. Staffing capacity as a
function of staff size has generally not been considered when examining
autonomy with the exception of some of the European literature on the topic.
For example, Ellinas and Suleiman (2012) found that cabinets with smaller staff

5

If one reads a state’s codes of law dealing control of staff within the branches, they will
see that control of the staff within the political branches is a power given to the branch
itself as opposed to an external body. A Statenet.com (LexisNexis) search of state codes
dealing with control of legislative and executive staffs, aside from agency staff, reveals that the
branches (often delegated to the committee or commission level) have authority in determining
staffing and qualifications for personnel employed within the branch.
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sizes were less autonomous than cabinets with larger staffs – which is similar to
what I expect here. Given the literature cited above on how stretched
commission staffs are it makes sense to examine staffing capacity as a function of
staff size.

There is additional empirical justification for this is one considers the
limits on staffing capacity noted in the failings of many ethics commissions. For
example, Delaware’s ethics commission consists of two staff members who are
responsible for ethics trainings, producing and reviewing forms for all elected
officials, compiling and annual report and addressing ethics issues for the state’s
nearly 48,000 public employees (www.stateintegrity.org 2012). Of course not all
states are as stressed as Delaware. Wisconsin has a staff of 34, Massachusetts has
a staff of 24 and Pennsylvania has a staff of 18. Given the noted stresses that
many ethics commission staffs are under though, it is more likely that a larger
staff relative to the commission’s duties will be able to act in a more autonomous
manner thus leading in a more autonomous commission.
Data and Analysis
The theory developed here was tested using data from the State Integrity
Investigation. In 2011 the State Integrity Investigation, conducted by the Center
for Public Integrity, surveyed state political reporters across 50 states in the
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United States. Blinded responses were reviewed by a second political reporter in
each state, who either affirmed or questioned the initial response. If a response
was questioned, then both respondents had to provide justification for their
opinion. All final responses required at least two independent sources of
verification, such as statutes, journal articles, or other corroboration. While the
survey’s goal was to rank the states based on their risk of corruption, 26 of the
survey’s 330 questions asked about the existence and independence of state
ethics commissions. Additionally, because it was a survey of political reporters,
the survey population could be expected to closely observe the political activities
in their states and, as such, findings should be more accurate than surveys of
average citizens.

The survey addressed 14 categories, including one that specifically
addressed ethics enforcement agencies in the state. The questions in this category
focused on the existence of merit appointments on commissions, auditing of
commissioner financial disclosures, and such. Respondents were asked if they
agreed with a statement (Table 3.1) addressing commissions’ freedom from
political influence:

In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics
rules are protected from political interference.
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Table 3.1 Dependent Variable – Commissions are free from political interference.
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies
tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are protected from
political interference.
Strongly Agree
8
Agree
16
Neither Agree nor Disagree
10
Disagree
4
Strongly Disagree
3
Note: Sum is 41 because 9 states do not have ethics commissions.

Hypotheses

To examine the statement above, five hypotheses were tested.
Financial Capacity: As a commission's financial capacity increases the
commission’s perceived freedom from political interference will also increase.
A commission’s budget is related to the number of activities with which it
is tasked. Commissions with higher task-to-budget ratios should show lower
levels of effectiveness. Simply measuring the number of activities with which a
commission is tasked is not sufficient, however, because in addition to specific
activities, commissions are empowered differently. Some have jurisdiction over
the legislature and its staff, some over the executive and its staff, some over both,
and some over all aspects of state government. The National Conference of State
Legislature (2014) collects data on ethics commission activities, including the
number of activities in each state. In their datasets, ethics commissions can
engage in up to seven activities: developing forms, developing manuals,
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reporting, subpoenaing witnesses, issuing advisory opinions, conducting ethics
training and developing annual reports (Table 3.2).

Table 3.2 Responsibilities of ethics commissions
Develop
Develop
Subpoena Advisory Conduct Yearly
Activity
Reporting
Forms
Manuals
Powers
Opinions Training Report
n
44
40
39
49
45
42
32
Source: National Council of State Legislatures: http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50state-chart-state-ethics-commissions-powers-a.asp1

Capacity of Commission Staff: Commissions with larger staff relative to the
number of issues addressed will be perceived as subject to less political
interference.
There are not reliable data on the types of individuals who serve on
commissions (e.g., lawyers versus educators, etc.), but there is reliable
information on the number of staff members and the number of activities for
which a commission staff is responsible (Table 2), providing a measure of
staffing capacity, i.e., the number of staff per issue handled by the commission.
As discussed above, if elected officials increase the workload of a commission
without providing increased budget for staffing, the capacity of a commission to
accomplish each task is diminished. Therefore, a reduced staff-to-activity ratio
should be associated with decreases in perceived effectiveness. In addition, as
stated above, differences in staffing levels relative to budget likely also reflect
different priorities. However, merely having a large staff does not guarantee the
effectiveness of a commission. For example, though lawyers’ salaries are larger
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than those of educators, they may be more qualified to conduct investigations
with legal ramifications.
Structural Independence: As elected officials’ power to appoint commissioners
becomes more dispersed, the perception of freedom from political interference
will increase.
Independence of personnel

As mentioned above, there can be multiple individuals involved in
appointing commissioners and multiple layers of confirmation required.
Additionally, the legislature will naturally have less centralized authority than
the governor because making appointments from the legislature necessarily
involves more individuals with appointment authority. For example, in South
Carolina the governor appoints all commissioners without any checks. In
Colorado, however, there are five members: one each appointed by the governor,
the president pro tempore of the senate, the speaker of the house, and the chief
justice of the state supreme court; those four members select the fifth.

For this study, a variable was created to measure political control: the
percentage appointed by a given political body divided by the number of checks
on an appointment.
 
 / 
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In the case of Colorado, the calculation for the legislature (senate and house)
would be:
2/5 0.4

 0.4
1
1
In Colorado, there are no external checks on an appointee, such as senate
confirmation or requirements of prior experience. In Wisconsin, however, there
are six ethics commissioners. All must be former judges (check 1), must be
nominated by the governor (check 2), and must be approved by both the
assembly (check 3) and the senate (check 4). The measure for the governor’s
authority would be:
6/6 1
  0.25
4
4
Thus, the lower the score the less influence any single individual has over the
appointment of a commissioner. This calculation method is preferable to simply
using the percentage appointed by, “the legislature” or “the governor,” because
it captures the degree to which those appointments are the result of greater
power in the hands of a single individual.

Finally, recall that not all commissions have oversight over all elected
branches. Some have oversight over the legislature, some over the governor, and
some over both. Rosenson (2003); Mackenzie (2002), Smith (2003) and others
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have shown that the legislature is more willing to use their appointment
authority to impose checks on the potential ethical abuses of the governor than
their own. Similarly, it is unlikely that a governor who is overseen by the
commission but has high appointment authority would appoint adversarial
individuals.

However, the same may be true of the legislature. In fact, some have made
the case that commissions may be largely symbolic (Smith 2003), partly because
legislators are able to empower ethics commissions that only oversee the
governor and not the legislature, and the public is none the wiser. All the public
is likely to see is that there is an ethics commission, and they assume that the
commission must be making sure that politicians are acting with integrity.
Removal Authority: Unilateral removal authority will be associated with a
decrease in the perception of freedom from political interference.
There are other means of political influence that may be exerted directly
on commissioners; chief amongst these is removal authority. Appointment
power is one tool, but the power to remove is also a potent weapon (see Kingdon
1995; Lewis 2008). To capture this, the model ranked states based on how much
control over the removal process was held by a single person, rankling from
most restrictive to least restrictive: 0 = a commissioner could not be removed; 1 =
he or she could be removed only through a formal procedure; 2 = he or she could
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be removed for cause, but cause was not defined; and 3 = he or she could be
removed without cause. If an appointee could be removed, but only with
concurrence of another body, the action was coded as a 2, because removal
required a formal procedure. For example, in Colorado, where an appointee can
be removed but only with the concurrence of the senate, the value would be 2. In
South Carolina, however, where the governor has unilateral control over
appointment and removal, the action would be coded as a 3.
Independence of Budget: Commissions that control their own budgets will be
subject to less political interference than commissions whose budgets flow
through those of elected branches.
To capture the independence of a commission’s budget, the survey asked
whether the commission controlled its own budget (1 = yes; 0 = no). Responses
were coded based on each state’s 2011 budget (the year of the survey), and a text
search was done for both the ethics commission and the empowering statute of
the ethics commission.ii If there was no mention of the commission in the state
budget, budget independence was coded as 0.

Economic Interests
When Rosenson (2003) looked at how ethics commissions were created,
her main hypothesis was that legislators with higher salaries would be less likely
to vote for the creation of commissions, since commissions could threaten their
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economic self-interest. However, there are economic interests that are not
accounted for simply by measuring official salaries of elected officials. They may
have assets in regulated industries, own large areas of land around areas that a
state may wish to buy, or be independently wealthy. Of course, access to true
economic interests presumes strong asset disclosure regulations—something that
many legislatures have been loath to provide, preferring to regulate quid-pro-quo
relationships (Tolchin and Tolchin 2001; Rosenson 2006).

Rather than examining only the compensation from salaries (Rosenson
2003; 2006; 2009), for the current study, the ratio of legislative salaries to the
average salary in each state was calculated. From these averages, it could be
determined whether an individual legislator was incurring a cost by serving in
the state legislature. A similar measure was used to examine corruption risks in
national legislatures (Casselli and Morelli 2004). That study showed that poorer
citizens who ran for office had more incentive to behave honestly in office
because they could reap more rewards from staying in office. According to
Casselli and Morelli (2004) this was because their salaries in office were higher
than their alternatives in the private sector.

In states with low legislative salaries relative to the average salary in the
state, it is likely that the people in office would have incomes that were
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significantly higher than the average salary in their state and would have greater
financial resources. Therefore the economic consequences of bad behavior are not
as great as for individuals in states with higher legislative salaries since they
could more easily absorb the costs of any fines than could the average citizen,
though there might be political costs. Nevertheless, given Rosenson’s (2003)
findings about economic incentives it is necessary to control for financial stakes
on a commission.

Socio-Economic Variables

Socio-economic variables have been shown to affect both the creation and
use of ethics commissions. The current study examined existing ethics
commissions and measured average taxable income per citizen in each state.
Rosenson (2003) found that wealthier states were more likely to establish ethics
commissions because ethics commissions cost tax dollars, and additional tax
revenues allow wealthier states to create commissions. Other studies (Menzel
1996; Menzel 2005; Meier and Holbrooke 1992) found that wealthier individuals
tend to file more ethics complaints. Additionally, income and educational
attainment are highly correlated (Glaeser and Saks 2006). Therefore, by
controlling for income, the model also controlled for other socio-economic
conditions that are associated with being better educated. For example, better
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educated people tend to be more politically active. Given findings about income
and ethics commissions (Rosenson 2003; Menzel 1996; Menzel 2005; Meier and
Holbrooke 1992), higher levels of income may be associated with higher
perceived effectiveness of ethics commissions.

Finally, to account for political differences between states, the study
measured the percentage of each state’s population that self-identified as
Democrat or Strong Democrat. Though reporters’ opinions are likely more
informed than the average citizen’s, theirs are still opinions that rely on selling
newspapers to readers with political beliefs that are common within each state,
and their responses may have been colored somewhat by those political
attitudes. We know that partisanship influences thinking about ethics, given
findings that Republicans and Democrats have different ideas about what
constitutes corruption (Redlawsk and McCann 2005). Though both parties
agreed that corruption constituted criminal behavior, they were diametrically
opposed over whether favoritism constituted corruption.

Model Specification
A partial proportional odds model (see Appendix A for a discussion of
this type of model) was used to test these hypotheses because of the use of
categorical dependent variables. Table 1 shows clustering of the responses
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around Agree, and Neither Agree nor Disagree, implying that the parallel slopes
assumption needed for an ordered logit or ordered probit has been violated. An
ordered probit was run to test this, and the Brant test for proportional odds was
significant (chi-square = 231.99), indicating that the parallel slopes assumption
was violated and any coefficients would be biased. Using a partial proportional
odds model loosens the assumption of parallel slopes and therefore seems to
make more sense than using an ordered probit or ordered logit. Additionally,
given the small number of observations, 1,000 bootstrapped resamples were used
to estimate the model.

The model specification was tested using a likelihood ratio test between
the model and a null model, as well as between the model and a larger model,
using variables that have been previously shown as predictors of corruption
convictions: educational attainment and religiosity (Glaeser and Saks 2006),
proximity of population centers to state capitals (Campante and Do 2013), and
percentage of the state employed in the public sector (Meier and Holbrooke
1992). The current model performed better than either the null or the more
saturated model.

Also note that the partial proportional odds model has certain
characteristics that make it preferable to the multinomial logit model—which
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also loosens the proportional odds assumption. Chief among these is that the
partial proportional odds model allows for the coefficients to be the same or
different for each category, something that cannot be done in other models such
as a multinomial logit. This is because the multinomial logit frees all variables,
when in fact the parallel lines assumption may only be violated by a few of the
variables (see Appendix A for a description).

Robustness Checks

As a check of robustness, I analyzed my data using three separate models
that included variables that are traditionally considered effective predictors of
corruption: percentage of population with a college degree or higher (Meier and
Holbrooke 1992); proximity of state capitals to population centers (Camapante
and Do 2013); and share of population that attends church regularly (Uslaner
2004). A full table of these robustness checks is available in Appendix C.
Additionally, all models included variables to capture competition between the
branches; for example, if a governor was monitored by the commission and the
majority share of appointment authority was in the legislature. As indicated by
the Likelihood Ratio test, the saturated model did not provide a better
explanation than the more parsimonious model. However, the interactions for
political competition did present some interesting findings (see Table 3.6),
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namely that when a governmental branch has control over appointments and is
also monitored by a commission, the perception that the commission is free from
political interference declines. Note that table 3.3 shows model coefficients while
table 3.4 show predicted probabilities and table 3.5 shows a correlation matrix of
the variables used as a check for autocorrelation.

66

Findings and Results
Table 3.3. Commissions are free from political interference
MODEL 1
boot
z
sig
β
σ
β
0.830
0.563 1.475
4.391
(Intercept):1
-0.119 0.559 -0.213
3.418
(Intercept):2
-1.289 0.559 -2.304 *
2.172
(Intercept):3
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(Intercept):4
Budget per Issue
Handles
Budget per n Monitored

-2.982

0.565

-5.279

***

Staff per Issue Handled
Legislature's
Appointment Authority
Governor's
Appointment Authority
Removal Power
Independence of Budget
Economic Interests
Average State Income

0.273
0.000

0.123
0.000

2.222
-1.126

*

0.326

MODEL 2
boot
z
σ
0.681 6.444
0.674 5.068
0.668 3.252
0.664

0.000

0.000

0.000

0.051

-3.733

0.409

-1.631

0.297

-0.289

0.053

0.086
0.298
0.000

0.183
0.145
0.000

sig
***
***
**

0.491

0.736
0.009
9.131
5.488
5.499
0.469
2.049
-

***
***
***
*
**

β
2.585
1.598
0.372
1.509

MODEL 3
boot
z
σ
0.786
3.287
0.781
2.046
0.776
0.479
0.774

-1.949

1.379

0.280

4.931

0.108

0.053

2.031

0.411

10.238

0.302

-6.480

0.051

-5.015

0.182
0.132
0.000

1.047
3.030
-3.250

4.209
1.955
0.257
0.191
0.400
0.000

sig
**
*

***

*
***
***
***
**
**

3.243
0.846 3.833
% Dem or Strong Dem
Z Levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001)
Residual deviance
AIC
BIC
Log-likelihood
LR test versus Saturated Model
DF

**

3.456

1.015

4.071
3.406

135.547
149.547
162.348
-67.774

129.769
155.769
179.541
-64.885

177

171

**

3.062

0.940

3.257

**

128.712
154.712
178.484
-64.356
3.382
171
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Model 1: Controls Only; Model 2: Independence of Budget as Budget per # Monitored; Model 3: Independence of
Budget as Budget per Issue. Note that Model 3 using Budget per Monitored is the preferred model given the lower
AIC and BIC. Note that AIC for Model 1 is smallest, but AIC includes a penalty for additional parameters hence the
distinction to be made is between Model 2 and Model 3. Note also that the better fit statistics for Model 1 are the
result of the small sample size – see Hurvich (1989) and Hu (2007). Model 3 indicates that Budget per Issue is
significant and in the expected direction H1; Staffing capacity is significant and in the expected direction of H2;
Independence of Appointees is significant, and in the expected direction of H3; Removal power is significant and in
the expected direction of H4; and Independence of Budget (H5) is rejected. Standard errors are based on an N=1000
resampling. The Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity was not significant at p<0.05. See table 3.5 for check of
autocorrelation.
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Table 3.4. Predicted Probabilities | a 1 standard deviation change in &'
Strongly
Disagree
Disagree
Budget per Issue
0.058
0.084
Staff per Issue Handled
0.095
0.114
0.366
0.242
Legislature's Appointment Authority
0.216
0.208
Governor's Appointment Authority
0.082
0.108
Removal Power
0.056
0.077
Legislature's Economic Interests
0.039
0.056
Average Taxable Income
0.142
0.164
% Dem or Strong Dem
0.091
0.107
Predicted Probabilities
0.087
0.109
Actual Distribution of Data

Neutral
0.219
0.234
0.247
0.305
0.261
0.213
0.169
0.306
0.225
0.239

Agree
0.426
0.374
0.132
0.231
0.402
0.436
0.437
0.313
0.376
0.369

Strongly
Agree
0.213
0.183
0.013
0.04
0.147
0.218
0.299
0.075
0.201
0.196

I use the predicted probabilities given a one standard deviation change in  to interpret the results of my model.
Given that I am using ordinal responses this seems more appropriate than marginal effects. Additionally other
approaches such as odds ratios can be difficult to interpret and are often misleading (see Davies 1998). I use a one SD
change instead of min and max because the max and min of the variables for appointment authority range from 0 to
1 for the Governor and 0 to 0.6 for the Legislature. These can be interpreted relative to the normal predicted
probabilities for the model at the bottom of the table. Note that the model closely predicts the actual distribution of
responses.

Table 3.5. Correlation of Independent and Control Variables
x
1
2
3
1 Legislature's Appointment Authority
1
2 Governor's Appointment Authority
-0.259
1
3 Budget per Issue
0.151
0.164
1
4 Removal Power
-0.055
-0.213 -0.075
5 Independence of Budget
-0.142
0.229
-0.229
6 Staff per Issue Handled
0.010
0.136
-0.078
7 Average Taxable Income
-0.102
-0.065 -0.144
8 % Dem or Strong Dem
-0.094
0.077
0.166
9 Legislature's Economic Interests
-0.029
0.056
-0.192

4

5

6

7

8

9

1
-0.181
0.091
-0.348
-0.030
0.043

1
0.308
-0.150
-0.012
0.062

1
-0.127
-0.262
0.246

1
0.260
-0.053

1
-0.078

1
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Note that no item shows a strong correlation with any other item thus indicating that autocorrelation should not be
an issue with these variables

Robustness Checks
Table 3.6. Interactions between Oversight and Appointment Authority
Neither
Strongly
Strongly
Agree nor
Agree
Disagree
Disagree
Agree
Disagree
Legislature is overseen as
Legislative Authority
0.065
0.162
0.324
0.364
0.084
Increases
Legislature is overseen as
Gubernatorial Authority
0.028
0.081
0.223
0.479
0.182
Increases
Differences between
0.037
0.081
0.101
-0.115
-0.098
oversight of Legislature
Governor is overseen as
Gubernatorial Authority
0.227
0.326
0.285
0.141
0.021
Increases
Governor is overseen as
Legislative Authority
0.108
0.231
0.343
0.267
0.049
Increases
Differences between
0.119
0.095
-0.058
-0.126
-0.028
oversight of Governor
Note. Differences are the difference between the perceived freedom from political
interference under different conditions for who has the most centralized appointment
authority. For coefficients from this model see Appendix C.

See Appendix C for a full check of robustness of my model. As a check of
robustness I also ran models which included variables that are traditionally
considered effective predictors of corruption: % of population with a college
degree of higher (Meier and Holbrooke 1992); proximity of state capitals to
population centers (Camapante and Do 2013); and share of population that
attends church regularly (Uslaner 2004). Additionally I included variables to
capture competition between the branches, for example if the Governor is
monitored by the commission and the majority share of appointment authority is
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in the Legislature. As indicated by the Likelihood Ratio test for this saturated
model, it does not provide a better explanation than the more parsimonious
model. However the interactions for political competition do present some
interesting findings as seen in table 6, namely that when a branch has more
control over appointments and is also monitored by the commission, the
perception that the commission is free from political interferences declines.
General Findings
The results of my model reflect the fact that current conceptualizations of
autonomy are not sufficient for explaining autonomy on ethics commissions.
More broadly this may point to a need to provide additional nuance to
discussions of autonomy based upon an agency’s proximity to political actors.
Specifically the ability of elected officials to control the financial and personnel
capacity of commissions is determinant of a commission’s autonomy, although
the ability to control the structural independence of the commission appears to
be the strongest determinant – see table 3.3.
Given that those making ethics policy are also subject to ethics policy, the
ability to control the capacity of ethics commissions to act and the independence
of the commission would seem to be a means elected officials would employ to
control the ability and/or desire of a commission to take action. My findings
support this notion. In this way, my findings indicate the primacy of politics in a
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specific relationship between elected officials and the bureaucracy. Although
this study is confined to ethics commissions, I believe similar findings would
hold for other agencies with the capacity to directly affect elected officials.
Findings for Financial Capacity
Increases in financial capacity and increases in staffing capacity are both
associated with increases in the probability of respondents agreeing that ethics
commissions are free from political interference. Financial capacity shows a
stronger effect though. Increases in a commission’s financial capacity are
associated with increases in perceived freedom from political interference. This
is important for two reasons. First, it is in keeping with Smith’s (2003ab) claims
that commissions may be forced to engage in educational and training activities
at the expense of other, more exploratory, activities. My model provides
empirical evidence that this is indeed the case. Additionally, since the budgets
for commissions are approved by the legislature, this may be a way the
legislature keeps the commission “under thumb” so to speak. The legislature
can task a commission with a large number of items but not provide a budget
sufficient to accomplish all of the administrative and high road responsibilities
and still have a sufficient amount left over for investigations.
If the above is the case then it may call into question the legitimacy of a
commission’s findings. It may be the case that more unethical activity is going
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on that the public is aware of and it only comes to light when the commission has
resources to investigate. Given these limited resources, and in light recent
evidence from New York and California, serious (criminal) unethical behavior is
more likely to be discovered in federal investigations. If the legislature can
ostensibly influence commissions through the budget then the kinds of
investigations that a commission chooses to conduct will be either glaringly
obvious violations where a conviction is almost a certainty, or it will be targeted
against those least able to fight back. This may explain Smith’s (2003a)
observation that most ethics investigations target low-level functionaries instead
of senior executive staff – they are easier targets and lack the resources to mount
a vigorous defense.
Findings for Staffing Capacity
My model also shows that as amount of staff per issue increases, the
commission’s perceived freedom from political interference increases as well.
This is expected given the previous literature on bureaucratic autonomy, i.e. the
ability of bureaucrats to act autonomously increases as they have more capacity
to address issues. Additionally, Fukuyama (2009) has shown that elected
officials often pass multiple, and often confounding, mandates in an effort to
steer the bureaucracy. The fact that this variable is significant as an indicator for
freedom from political interference is interesting though. This is because it
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indicates that these respondents view workload as a means of exerting political
influence.

This view is bulwarked by the fact that staff per issue was not significant
in MODEL 2 which used budget per member as the functional form for
measuring financial capacity; however it was significant in MODEL 3 which
used budget per issue as the measure of financial capacity. One may be quick to
assume that because both the measure for staffing capacity and financial capacity
use the number of issues as the denominator then they must be correlated –a
robustness check using only workload as a variable without budget or staffing
did not perform any better or change the model’s coefficients. I would argue
then that because these are both measures weighted by the number of issues that
they serve as a strong indication that elected officials use workload as a means of
affecting budgets and controlling financial capacity. Staffing decisions are
obviously related to budget, though not directly so, but they are also a function
of the goals of an organization’s leaders. Knowing this, staffing per issue likely
becomes significant in the presence of budget per issue because they are both
related to elected official’s ability to control commissions. Financial capacity as
measured by budget per issue is directly related to the decisions of elected
officials. Staffing capacity on the other hand is indirectly related to the decisions
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of elected officials by way of the goals espoused by those who they appoint to a
commission’s leadership.

Increasing workloads serves as an ex ante means of political influence
similar to other procedures detailed by others such as Cox and McCubbins
(1987). Although this variable was significant, the changes as staff per issue
increase closely tracks to the predicted probabilities of the model generally, i.e.
there is not a large change in predictions when allowing staff per issue a one
standard deviation increase with all else constant. A likely reason for this is that
staffing decisions are decisions by the commission and may reflect attitudes of
those who are appointed by elected officials. Therefore one could consider
workload to be an attitudinal trait of the commission’s leadership.
Findings on Structural Independence
Weaker removal authority and increased independence of personnel both
increase the probability of respondents agreeing that commissions are free from
political interference. The strongest effect of any variable comes from the
measure for independence of personnel, particularly Increases in legislative
control over appointments. As the appointment authority of elected officials
increases the model closely predicts the distributions that are seen in the data.
Once interaction effects, i.e. competition between the branches is accounted for,
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then the results show that political influence is dependent upon which branch is
monitored and which branch has appointment authority. When the commission
has oversight over the legislature but the legislature has a high degree of
appointment authority, the likelihood of a respondent agreeing or strongly
agreeing that the commission is free from political interference is lower than
when the governor has more appointment authority – see table 3.6. Just as
important, it is more likely that respondents will strongly disagree or disagree
that the commission is free from political influence when the monitored branch
also has more centralized appointment authority. Note though that the effect is
stronger for the governor than the legislature.
From the above, several findings are available. Fist the respondents
recognize the conflict of interest when the branch that is overseen by the
commission also has the bulk of appointment authority over the commission.
This seems like an obvious point, but it is one that is not readily considered by
the public. Additionally, given that the design of commissions is a conscious
process; this supports a claim that when commissions were created elected
officials understood that they could become a threat and so sought means of
maintaining control over them. This goes beyond Rosenson’s (2003) findings
that when elected official’s economic influence is not threatened they are more
likely to empower ethics commissions. It shows that it is not just that
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commissions are formed when they are not threatening, but that elected officials
actively sought to keep them from becoming a threat.
Next, in looking at the gubernatorial oversight, it is quite clear that the
governor’s unitary influence has more impact than the legislature’s more diffuse
influence. Additionally, the perceived freedom from political influence is lower
in general when the governor is overseen versus when the legislature is
overseen. It may very well be the case that the governor as a unitary figure can
exert more influence over the commission that the legislature as a whole.
However, another potential explanation for this comes from theories from Niemi,
Stanley and Vogel (1995) and Hale (2013). The governor tends to be seen as the
locus of control in state politics and in general tends to receive more credit and
more blame than he/she is really entitled. In other words, the governor’s
position as the figure head and most visible individual in state politics means
that respondents may believe that he/she has more influence over the
commission than he/she really does.
Finally, as it becomes more difficult to remove a commissioner, perceived
freedom from political interference increases. This indicates that elected officials
use removal, or the threat of removal, as a means of influencing commissioners.
This is in keeping with previous findings for political control over the
bureaucracy, i.e. the ability to appoint is important for getting likeminded people
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in place, but the threat of removal is necessary to keep them in line with one’s
way of thinking (see Kingdon 1995; Lewis 2008).
Discussion

Practical Takeaways

From the study findings, it is possible to compare a commission that is
free from political influence to one that is not free. This comparison should
provide a structural example to those who seek to reform or establish such
institutions. The ethics commission in Wisconsin was perceived by both the
respondent and reviewer from that state to be largely free from political
influence. In Wisconsin, the governor has only weak appointment authority, and
the legislature has none. There are merit requirements for those who can serve as
commissioner, since they all must be former elected judges (National Conference
of State Legislatures 2014). Additionally, no commissioner may have partisan
affiliations or be an officer or employee of any state or local organizations
associated with political activity. Though all six commissioners are selected by
the governor, they must be approved by the house and senate (National
Conference of State Legislatures 2014).

These requirements indicate the high value placed on the independence of
Wisconsin’s ethics commission. Additionally, the fact that commissioners must
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be former elected judges shows concern for the quality and experience of the
individuals serving as commissioners. Because of strong merit requirements and
the fact that no single individual can be appointed because of a political favor,
the perception of freedom from partisan interference is very high (Table 4).

If we compare Wisconsin’s commission to one perceived as not free from
political interference, such as Delaware’s, the differences in institutional design
are stark. Delaware has loose restrictions concerning who may serve on the
commission, more a nod to independence than anything more robust. In
Delaware, the only political restrictions are that an appointee not be an elected
official or a candidate for public office. However, there are no restrictions against
having previously been an elected official (29 Del. Laws ch. 58.1 § 5808, available
at http://delcode.delaware.gov/title29/c058/sc01/index.shtml). All seven members
are appointed by the governor and require senate confirmation.

In Delaware, unlike in Wisconsin, there are no set standards of
competence, only standards describing who may not serve, and loose ones at
that. Both the Delaware respondent and reviewer disagreed that appointments to
the Delaware commission were made on the basis of merit. Additionally, they
both disagreed that the commission was free from political influence.
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A key external factor in designing or reforming ethics commissions is
ensuring that there are standards of competence that would be difficult for an
elected official to manipulate. For example, states could require that credentials
be validated from an external source, such as the state bar association or state
supreme court, for judges serving as commissioners. Negative standards, such as
requiring that a commissioner not be an elected official, may provide a guise of
independence but do not appear to be very effective in preventing political
interference. Spreading the responsibility for appointment among different
branches of state government and prohibiting confirmation without external
validation of merit may decrease the ability of elected officials to influence the
commission.

Future Research

Ethics commissions should be assessed from a functional perspective
rather than a symbolic perspective. For example, the fines that ethics
commissions are able to levy are relatively weak compared to the consequences
of a criminal prosecution. However, it should be acknowledged that
commissions also do serve a symbolic function, in that they point to an ideal of
accountability and a standard of what communities will and will not tolerate.
Both the functional and the symbolic aspects of commissions are important, and
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they are not mutually exclusive. However, meeting the functional requirements
of an ethics commission must go beyond minimal standards, or it will not
necessarily satisfy symbolic requirements, for reasons related to the findings of
this study.
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Chapter Four: The Impacts of Political Control on the Effectiveness
of State Ethics Commissions

Introduction
In this manuscript I explore the effects of political influence on the
effectiveness of ethics commission monitoring activities. Ethics commissions are
in place to ensure that the public’s business is done “in daylight” and to ensure
that public officials avoid corruption or even the appearance of corruption. For
this reason I examine the effectiveness of ethics commissions in terms of how
well commissions prevent conflicts of interest amongst elected officials. Prior
studies have examined ethics commissions in context of their creation (Rosenson
2003; 2005; 2009) or in terms of their internal functions, e.g. how they go about
achieving their missions (see Smith 2003 ab; Lewis and Gilman 2012). Few if any
of the existing studies of which I am aware look at the influence of political forces
on ethics commission activities. Rather they focus on economic outcomes of
corruption, on why/how ethics commissions come to be, or on the day-to-day
functioning of commissions from a public management perspective. I consider
that a commission’s performance is influenced by both internal and external
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factors. My findings indicate that although Governors and state legislatures seek
to influence ethics commissions through political means, the goals of their
influence are very different.
The key external control with which I am concerned is formal political
influence, i.e. how influence over a commission manifests itself through the
capacity of elected officials to appoint members of a commission. As such I
confine my measures to the effectiveness of monitoring of the legislative and
executive branches since they have the great authority over appointing
commissioners. Specifically I examine the executive’s and legislature’s ability to
appoint commissioners and the ease with which they may remove
commissioners.
The ability to appoint or remove is not the only thing that influences
commissions though. Among the other factors that influence commissions is
institutional capacity – confined here to the capacity of commissions to utilize
financial resources and the capacity of staffs to achieve goals. Krause and Woods
(2012) argue that we should take institutional capacity seriously, but they also
claim that one must be specific as to the type of relationships we are talking
about. For example, theories about Congress and the federal bureaucracy do not
necessarily translate to useful theories about state legislatures and state
bureaucracies and so my result should be taken to apply specifically to state
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governments. Given the dearth of empirical studies of legislative-executive
relations at the state level in recent years, my study contributes both to the study
of ethics commissions, and to a smaller degree, to the study of legislativeexecutive relationships at the state level.
This manuscript proceeds with a discussion of ethics commissions and
their activities, and is followed by a more in depth description of my theory. I
then describe the variables used in this manuscript and specify a model for
testing the alternative theories. This is followed by findings, conclusions and
discussion.

Performance in Context
Influence and Performance
Page (2006) presents a model that envisions organizational performance as
a web in which political and bureaucratic actors utilize different tools to affect
the performance of an organization. In his model, legislators influence
performance through supervision, oversight, and voice. Influence via
supervision and oversight is persistent in the organizational performance
literature dating back to at least Gilbert (1954) and up through Michener (2014).
Page’s model does not directly consider executive influence, primarily because
his concerns are agency relationships with congress and with other agencies.
While commissions are public organizations and are subject to many of the same
85

internal constraints as other organizations, e.g. staff size, budget constraints, etc.
because of their unique mission they are also distinct from other traditional
public organizations.
Commissions are unique since many believe they are independent
because our notion of what they are – symbols of integrity – suggests that they
should be so. Commissioners are appointed by political actors though, and also
have the responsibility of monitoring political actors. While commissions may
be independent in name, the fact that commissioners are appointed by elected
officials and have budgets controlled by elected officials (the legislature) seems
to bely the notion that they can be truly independent.
Legislative and Executive Political Influence
Political Competition
External political influence can manifest itself in a variety of ways not all
of which are mutually exclusive. It is possible that legislatures use their political
influence over commissions in an adversarial relationship with the executive
branch – and vice versa. It is therefore possible to think of the legislature and
executive in competition with each other using the ethics commission as a
weapon in this fight. If this is the case then commission activities with regard to
the governor should be more effective when the legislature has more control over
the commission. One prediction would then be a adversarial relationship with
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higher legislative (executive) influence associated with more effective monitoring
of the executive (legislature)
Avoidance of Oversight
A second alternative is that elected officials are not necessarily in
competition with one another, but utilize their political influence as a way to
draw attention away from themselves. This would mean that when there is
greater political influence from the legislature then there would less perceived
effectiveness of monitoring over the legislature. However this by itself would
say nothing about the perceived influence of the governor – and vice versa.
Singular Control
A third alternative is that both of the above scenarios are correct. This
process would involve the legislature (executive) drawing attention away from
itself but focusing attention on the executive (legislature). This means that
elected officials use their influence to avoid scrutiny of their own branch while at
the same time directing scrutiny towards the other branch. If this is the case then
the level of perceived political influence from a given branch (legislature or
executive) should be largely proportional to the perceived effectiveness of
monitoring of that branch.
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Ethics Commissions
Ethics commissions in the US largely have their origin in the years just
following the Watergate scandal (Rosenson 2003). The popular view of ethics
commissions is that they reinforce public confidence in both public and political
institutions. Specifically, commissions keep political and elected officials honest
by shining a bright light on their activities. The argument is that these
commissions highlight potential violations of ethics laws; shine a bright light on
conflicts of interest, and allow citizens to verify the integrity of officials and their
actions. This logic works if the risk of exposure is greater than the reward of the
corrupt activity. Of course this ideal is seldom met. In reality ethics
commissions tend to follow a compliance checklist of requirements and
prohibited behaviors. Even then, disclosures are left unexamined, conflicts of
interest are not resolved (or disclosed) and public information may not be
available (Lewis & Gilman, 2012).
As examples of the above, the Center for Public Integrity (2012) found that
since Tennessee established an ethics commission in 2006 it has yet to investigate
a single claim. Also, in 2011 North Carolina State Representative Stephen
LaRoque pushed for loosening of billboard regulations despite the fact that the
company he owned, LaRoque Management Group, had connections to the
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billboard industry6. There are structural and budgetary arguments for these
failings. While structure shapes the formal powers of elected officials over ethics
commissions, this formal power in turn shapes the effectiveness of the
commissions and their exercising of oversight power.
Ethics commissions and their powers are path dependent. Subsequently
these commissions tend to take on similar institutional structures and rules.
They have similar powers because the public has similar expectations about what
constitutes ethical behavior but not well formed expectations – they are mostly
symbolic relating to quid-pro-quo and the like. Given this, arguments about
public expectation only go so far in explaining why commissions take the actions
they do, or why some are perceived as more(less) effective than others. The
public does not appoint commissioners on an ethics commission; nor do they
have any role in determining an ethics commission’s oversight powers. These
activities are typically the purview of elected officials who empower ethics
commissions through laws, appoint the commissioners, can remove
commissioners, and control the commissions’ budgets. This relationship makes
elected officials more akin to stakeholders, while the public is typically
inattentive, absent some focusing event such as a scandal (Rosenson 2003).

6

http://www.scribd.com/doc/79607815/LMG-Balance-Sheet
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Political Control on Commissions
Ethics commissioners are primarily appointed positions. Even in the cases
when a commissioner is not appointed by an elected official they are still selected
by people who are appointed by elected officials. For example in Colorado the
commission has five members, four of whom are appointed and the fifth that is
selected by those four. This is as opposed to South Carolina where the governor
appoints nine commissioners, all without a confirmation process.
States display variations in how much appointment authority any branch,
or any single actor has in appointing commissioners. This appointment
authority is in turn correlated with variation in an ethics commission’s autonomy
(see chapter3). When the legislature has more control over who sits on the
commission there is a stronger perception of political influence over
appointments. This is less true when there is greater influence in the executive
over who sits on a commission. Relating this to the literature, this is arguably
because the executive is seen as the “locus of control” in state government
(Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995; Hale 2013). As such, the attempts by a single
unitary individual, i.e. the governor, to attempt to overtly control who sits on the
ethics commission is more easily traced. Since governors do not want to be seen
as corrupt they likely do not appoint overtly biased individuals to sit on
commissions.
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Using data from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation, I previously
demonstrated that the greater the level of unitary appointment authority for the
legislature, the lower the perception that the commission could act
autonomously. Using this same data I extend this work by providing evidence
that the level of political control over a commission affects the effectiveness of a
commission. Meier and Holbrooke (1992) and Maxwell and Winters (2005) have
suggested that the existence of regulations such as campaign finance laws have
no effect on levels of corruption. Regulations are not always effective or even
meaningful though, however the independence of the body tasked with
enforcement may do a great deal to enhance the effectiveness of a regulation.
Ethics commissions are generally tasked with addressing and
investigating conflicts of interest and indicators of corruption – failure to register
as a lobbyist, failure to file financial disclosures, and so on; but this does not
mean that all commissions do this equally well given that they are not equally
independent. For example the events leading New York Senate GOP Majority
leader Joe Bruno’s indictment were initially uncovered during the federal
investigation despite the fact that the state’s legislative ethics commission had
requirements that individuals file campaign finance disclosures, and income
statements, etc.
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Commissions in a Management Context
In this manuscript I claim that commissions as organizations are affected
by both internal and external influences. Previous studies in organizational
performance have shown that managers in organizations have ample capacity to
influence performance (Meier and O’Toole 2001; 2002). Commissioners act in a
managerial role on ethics commissions by shaping the patterns of activity on a
commission and determining how ethics regulations should be implemented.
However commissions are also beholden to political officials; this in turn limits
their level of autonomy (see chapter 3). As an aside this likely truer for ethics
commissions than other organizations, since a commission has the capacity to
harm elected officials through fines, exposure, or just being labelled as corrupt.
In the previous chapter I demonstrated that when it comes to predicting a
commission’s level of autonomy, appointment authority appears to have a strong
effect on political influence over ethics commissions. The findings suggested that
there is more perceived political interference and thus less discretion over how to
influence ethics policy, when the branch that is being overseen also has more
appointment authority over the commission. Here I extend this assertion and
test the effects of political influence over effectiveness.
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In considering the effects of political influence there are several possible
paths for how political influence affects a commission’s performance. These
paths depend on the motivations of those seeking influence.
Evading Scrutiny
First it is possible that elected officials use their appointment authority to
the commission to gain favors or direct attention away from their own activities.
Appointees may be friendly to, or easily influenced by, the appointer and will
use exercise little oversight over the appointer. This may include pre-clearance
of specific activities, a lack of investigations, etc. In any case it should be clear
that the effectiveness of a commission’s efforts to regulate the executive or the
legislature should be related to the political influence that body holds over the
commission. This is not a new proposition by itself, but an extension of more
general work on the use of appointment authority to control the bureaucracy,
e.g. Abney and Lauth (1983), Bowling and Wright (1998), and McCarty (2004).
If this sort of relationship exists then it should manifest itself in how
effectively a commission checks a particular branch. That is if the governor has
more control over who sits on the commission then the governor has the most
appointment authority over the commission and there should be less perceived
effectiveness of oversight over the governor’s office. The same would be true for
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the legislature should the legislature have more appointment authority, and
thereby more influence.
Political Competition
We know from Rosenson’s (2003; 2005; 2009) works that the legislature is
more willing to check the governor than themselves. Additionally, the different
branches may see value in going after one another, or may be more prevalent in
divided government, i.e. the party in the branch with the most appointment
authority may be unified against another branch. For example if the legislature
has more influence over a commission then it may see value both in drawing
attention away from itself and in directing attention towards the governor. Such
relationships have been described as the legislature seeking to use the governor
as a symbol and the checking of the governor as a signal that they are serious
about combatting corruption (Smith 2011; Rosenson 2009). Furthermore such a
relationship is in keeping with the idea of the governor as the “locus of control”
in state politics (Niemi, Stanley and Vogel 1995). The actual power of the
governor is unimportant in this since governor, as a unitary authority figure, is
perceived as having more formal authority than is actually the case.
This type of relationship is about more than using the commission to
avoid scrutiny. In this case the commission is used as a tool to go after the other
branch. Of course evading scrutiny is not incompatible with an adversarial
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relationship. There is nothing about using the commission to go after the other
branch that precludes one from directing its attention away from one’s own
branch – in fact it would seem to be an easier scenario given that commissions
have limited resources. From Rosenson’s aforementioned work it seems that this
is a possibility especially with the legislature. However it is unclear how well the
legislature’s activities translate into the effectiveness of a commission, or lack
thereof, in overseeing a governor. Furthermore it is unclear how, or even if,
governors influence commissions as a check on the legislature. On the one hand
it is possible that governors would be loath to use their appointment authority to
influence the commission towards the legislature. The legislature has more
checks over the governor than the governor over the legislature so it may not be
worth the risk. Knowing the public’s perception of gubernatorial authority
though, there may be an incentive for the governor to appear tough on curbing
corruption, and so he/she may empower the commission with more means to go
after the legislature. Doing this though would likely also provide a means of
increasing oversight of his/her own office and so the governor may not wish to
take this risk.
Given that commissions have the potential to do harm to elected officials
both financially and economically (Rosenson 2003), there is a definite incentive
for elected officials to maintain control over commissions. As Rosenson (2003;
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2005; 2009) demonstrated, elected officials empower commissions when they
perceive that they will not be a threat. It makes sense that these same elected
officials would want to ensure that the commissions do not become a threat in
the future. In the previous chapter I demonstrated that elected officials will use
their appointment authority as a means of political influence over a commission;
left unanswered is whether this influence matters with regards to a commission’s
effectiveness.
Witch Hunts
There is one final possibility that is most likely the case in the legislature.
It is possible that, in the legislature specifically, legislators are self-interested and
use the commission as a tool against political rivals. Under this relationship
members of the legislature go after other members of the legislature. This
creates a collective action problem where individual legislators are acting based
on their own interests. In this case the commission goes after other legislators;
this in turn prevents the legislature from using its influence to direct attention
away from itself. Therefore one would not expect the legislature to act as a
unitary branch, but rather to act as individuals within a branch.
Support for this position comes from the literature on legislative
delegation at the state level, e.g. McGrath (2012); Krause and Woods (2012); Arai
(2012); and Krause (2013). Arguments within this literature require that the
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bureaucracy be able to perceive the preferences of the legislature in order to be
responsive to legislative influence. Because there is not normally a single
appointment from “the legislature” considering legislative influence as a single
unitary form of influence does not really make sense. Arguing such would
assume there is a single voice within the legislature to appoint commissioners,
speak for the legislature as a whole, and so on. The reason for this is that while
“the legislature” as a body may desire to avoid oversight, individual legislators
may seek to expose rivals – e.g. it reveals the ambiguity of legislative control
since there are different motivations within the legislature.

Hypotheses
From the above I propose four separate hypotheses to test the theories of a
scrutiny evasion relationship, an inter-branch adversarial relationship (while
noting that the two are theoretically not mutually exclusive), a relationship
categorized by using the commission as tools against political rivals:
Evading Scrutiny: As a branch’s appointment authority over the ethics
commission increases, the perceived effectiveness of regulations overseeing that
branch decreases.
Under this hypothesis, elected officials seek to influence the commission
to benefit themselves but do not use the commission as a tool against another
branch. Appointment authority serves primarily as a gatekeeping function to the
commission. As a gatekeeping function though it allows elected officials to
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screen out individuals who would be outright hostile to them and in turn
appoint friendly or easily influenced individuals. Given the above, I expect that
as a branch’s appointment authority increases the perceived effectiveness of a
commission monitoring that branch will decrease.
Inter-branch Adversarial: As a branch’s appointment authority as a means
increases, the perceived effectiveness of oversight over another branch also
increases.
Under this hypothesis elected officials do not seek direct benefits for
themselves. Rather the branch with more appointment power over the
commission uses the commission as a tool against the other branch. Again the
assumed mechanism at work is the gatekeeper function – elected officials
appoint commissioners who are friendly and/or easily influenced. However,
under this hypothesis the goal of appointing these types of individuals is not to
shield one’s-self but to deflect attention and redirect it at the “other” branch.
Witch Hunts: As political influence from the legislature increases the perceived
effectiveness of regulations overseeing the executive also increases.
Under this hypothesis members of the legislature specifically seek to use
the commission as tool against other members of the legislature. Therefore one
would expect to see appointment authority positively associated with perceived
effectiveness because more activity would be getting exposed. Bear in mind this
is premised on the notion that effectiveness is equated with exposure rather than
on preventing ethical lapses.
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Resource Dependence: As the capacity of a commission increases, the perceived
effectiveness of the commission will increase as well.
Given that appointment authority serves primarily a gatekeeping function, it is
possible for commissioners to be appointed and then “go native.” Their ability to
do this though is dependent upon the resources available to them. Therefore, a
commission’s capacity (both financial and staffing) will likely be a determinant of
the commission’s effectiveness.

Research Design
Data & Methods
In this section I describe the data used in my models. I begin with the
dependent variables. These were already described to a degree in the
introduction but I provide a review here – see table 4.1 for the values of the
dependent variables. The data come from the 2011 State Integrity Investigation.
This survey used 330 questions compiled into 14 categories and 60 subcategories.
Of the 14 categories, one dealt specifically with the legislature and one dealt
specifically with the executive. A subcategory within both the Legislative and
Executive category addressed the effectiveness of regulations over conflicts of
interest in each branch – which are a key function of ethics commissions. One
subcategory addressed the existence of these regulations, e.g. “Are there
regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch (defined here
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as governors and/or cabinet-level officials)? While another addressed the
effectiveness of these regulations, e.g. “Are regulations governing conflicts of
interest by members of the state legislature effective?” For a list of the questions
comprised in each response see Appendix B.
Both of these categories were created by averaging the ordinal responses
of 6 individual questions. To address the issue of averaging up ordinal
responses, my initial approach was to conduct a polychoric factor analysis on
each category. However the Very Simple Structures criterion indicated severe
overfactoring, i.e. 7 factors from 12 questions. Because of this I resort to using an
aggregate index which is simply the average of the responses from each
question. In practice this is just the subcategory score from the surveyiii. Grice
(2001) and DiSteffano, Zhu and Mindrilla (2009) both suggest this approach
when overfactoring is present. Also, both note that while this approach is not
ideal, it is fairly standard practice for studies involving factor analysis. For list of
the aggregate index scores for each state see table 4.1. One immediately notices
that the scores for the executive are on average higher. This is consistent with
Rosenson’s (2003) previous findings that elected officials are more likely to
empower commissions when they perceive that they will not be a threat to them.
What is at issue is whether there is a systematic difference between the two
branches based upon political influence over the commission. Specifically, do
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the executive and legislative branches use the same method of influence over an
ethics commission but for different ends? The prior constraint implied here is
that ethics commissions have many masters with diffuse influence from the
legislature, but a unitary master in the governor. Both sets of masters seek to
influence the commission, but to what end? Are the ends different for the
legislature than the executive?
Table 4.1. Dependent Variables for Models
State
Alabama
Alaska Gov
Alaska Leg
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois Gov
Illinois Leg
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky Gov
Kentucky Leg
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

Variables
Executive oversight is effective.
65.000
50.000

Legislative oversight is effective
41.667
16.667
33.333
33.333
33.333
41.667
8.333
29.167
8.333
33.333

55.000
60.000
70.000
75.000
75.000
55.000
25.000
65.000
55.000

25.000
25.000
41.667
37.500

45.000
65.000
45.000
60.000

29.167
41.667
20.833
33.333
62.500
45.833
33.333
33.333
45.833

60.000
35.000
30.000
50.000
55.000
35.000
25.000
65.000
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State
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Jersey
New York Gov
New York Leg
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Washington Gov
Washington Leg
West Virginia
Wisconsin

Variables
Executive oversight is effective.
60.000
45.000
40.000
90.000
35.000

Legislative oversight is effective
41.667
25.000
25.000
45.833
41.667
16.667
16.667
33.333
0.000
16.667
25.000
50.000
45.833
12.500
20.833

55.000
40.000
40.000
35.000
40.000
60.000
25.000
60.000
10.000
70.000
60.000

62.500
37.500
50.000

50.000
65.000

Explanatory and Control Variables
Political Influence
My key explanatory variable is a commission’s freedom from political
interference. To measure this I use a question from the SII, “In practice, members
of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are
protected from political interference.” This response was rated on a five point
ordinal scale from Strongly Disagree (1) to Strongly Agree (5). Recall that this
was the dependent variable in the previous chapter and increases in an elected
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officials’ appointment power was significantly associated with decreases in
perceived freedom from political interference.

Using the direct measure will not provide any indication of how
appointment authority affects political interference which in turn affects the
effectiveness of the commission. This is because the question was general to the
commission, not specific to any single branch. To get at branch-specific measures
I use the estimated effect of appointment authority on freedom from political
interference as my explanatory variable to measure how appointment authority
as a means of political influence affects the effectiveness of a commission, i.e.
()*+,- .|     0,2 . This is the predicted probability of a
respondent giving the response that they actually gave given the effect of the
variable for appointment authority (all other variables are held at their mean).
There are two reasons for using this approach: (1) I reduce the risk of
autocorrelation while preserving the intent of the ordering; and (2) I capture the
effects of appointment authority on perceived freedom from political
interference. This is ostensibly a two-stage estimation, however a two-stage least
squares model cannot be estimated here since the first variable is ordinal and
there is not agreement on how to treat the error term produced from a first-stage
ordinal model and the second-stage model is not (Borjas and Sueyoshi 1993). In
my model I use the first-stage predicted probability for freedom from political
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interference given a branch’s appointment authority. In the second stage model,
the linear regression, I incorporate these predicted individual probabilities as an
additional explanatory variable. Langbein (2012) demonstrates this approach as
a remedy to problems of selection bias. I term this variable “Political Influence”
since it is capturing the effects of Legislature’s and Executive’s chief means of
wielding power over the commissions.

In my model I use a variety of controls. These controls are designed to
account for both organizational capacity including staffing capacity and financial
capacity. I also control for spatial factors that predict state-level corruption and
the interest in politics from state to state.
Internal Constraints
Budgets
Budgets tend to be blunt instruments in trying to elicit policy change
(Behn 2003) but a lack of resources may also shape what a commission is capable
of doing. Smith (2003a) argues that legislatures use their ability to assign tasks
(administrative strategy) and control the budget commissions have to
accomplish those tasks, as a means of weakening commission oversight. In the
previous chapter I showed that budget and staffing were significant predictors of
political influence over a commission. The functional form of those measures
was different than what I use here though. To explain political influence I used
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measures of financial capacity and staffing capacity that included the proportion
of the logged budget going towards a given number of activities, and the
proportion of staff per a given number of activities. Because my concern here is
not autonomy but the effectiveness of monitoring specific branches I use
different functional forms to model this relationship. For budget, I use

345 67859:
 ;4:4 98

in order to capture the budget per monitored individual – note that this
functional form was not shown to be significant in predicting my measure for
autonomyiv.
The size of a state is not reflected in the size of its legislature. For
example, Georgia has 236 legislators, whereas Minnesota has 201, South Carolina
has 170 and New York only has 213. However the size of the commission’s
budget is tied to the size of the state, hence the log transformation. Without this
transformation the data skew more towards more populous states and the mean
does not provide good representation of all states.
Staff
Monetary resources are one constraint on a commission’s effectiveness,
but another is staffing. Although budget and staffing are obviously linked they
are not perfect predictors of one another. For example a smaller staff with more
lawyers may cost about as much as a larger staff with more educators.
Additionally staff size, like budgets, can be an indicator of how seriously certain
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activities are taken (Rhodes 1994). Therefore staff size should be considered as
another marker of resources available to commissions. An improved measure
would be to count the number of lawyers or regulators versus the number of
educators or administrative staff in a commission. However reliable staffing
counts were unavailable.
In the previous chapter I treated staff size as a function of the budget as a
predictor of autonomy, i.e. the capacity of staff as a function of the budget
explained autonomy. Because I use the predicted probability from the first
model as an explanatory variable in this model, I use a different functional form
of staffing for two reasons. First, to avoid autocorrelation and second, because
my dependent variable is about avoiding conflicts of interest, as the ratio of staff
to number monitored increases there are likely more chances for conflicts of
<:== <>9

interest to occur. My measure is,  ;4:4
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Commission structure may have an impact on how much an elected
official can exert political influence. For example, agencies that are established in
statute and have appointed agency heads may have more cover from political
influence than commissions that exist as a subsidiary of an elected branch.
Commissions are “independent” bodies established under an elected branch – so
a commission may have the legal distinction of being a part of the executive or
legislative branch. Agencies are established as separate legal entities that can
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exercise more independence from legislative or executive control. As such these
distinctions may be important in how much influence can manifest itself. To
capture these distinctions I use a dichotomous measure based upon whether the
body in question is an agency established in statute with a line-item in the state
budget, or if it is a commission with a budget that is a flow-through from a
political branch (1 if an agency, 0 if a commission).
Regulations Exist
Because I am using a dependent variable which asks about the
effectiveness of regulations, I include a control for whether or not regulations
exist. Obviously if the regulations do not exist then counting them as being
ineffective would bias the results. Because my dependent variable is an
aggregate of questions about the effectiveness of regulations, this variable is an
aggregate of the questions for the existence of those regulations. It could be the
case that a particularly strong commission exposes misdeeds as a matter of
practice rather than being empowered by regulations. That is, one commission
may only investigate when some compliance or filing standard has not been met;
while others may be more proactive in their investigations. In addition to these
concerns, Rosenson (2003) showed that the legislature is more likely to pass
regulations overseeing the executive than the legislature. After all some
commissions are established by the legislature but only have the authority to
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regulate the executive while other commissions have the authority to regulate
both the executive and the legislature. As such, the measure controlling for the
existence of regulations is necessary for comparing the results between the
legislature and executive.
State Level Controls
One obvious issue when using surveys that ask about things like conflicts
of interest is that the definition of what constitutes a conflict of interest may
differ from state-to-state. What is considered a conflict of interest in South
Carolina may be considered standard procedure in New Jersey. To account for
this difference in views I use state level variables designed to capture some
(obviously not all) political and value differences between states.
Controls are drawn from the 2011 update to the 2010 census. I use the
2011 update because the SII was conducted in 2011. These include the
percentage identifying as Democrats or Strong Democrats as a control for
partisan make-up and a spatial measure for the distance of the state capitol to
major population centers.
Partisanship
To measure partisanship I use the percentage identifying as democrats or
strong democrats. Redlawsk and McCann (2005) found that Republicans and
Democrats have different ideas about what constitutes corruption. Neither party
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was significantly different from one another on whether or not corruption
constituted criminal behavior. However the parties were diametrically opposed
(reversed signs) when it came to whether or not favoritism constituted
corruption. Therefore partisan differences may shape what is viewed as a
conflict of interest.
Spatial Controls
Finally spatial factors may be associated with different responses, especially
since the respondents are reporters. Having more population in closer proximity
to centers of government means that there is a larger media market for stories
concerning the government (Campante and Do 2013). Therefore respondents in
states with more population in greater proximity to state capitals are likely to be
more sensitive to conflicts of interest since their share of the market for
government stories is larger. Standard spatial indices such as the Herfindhal
index only capture concentration over a uniform space as opposed to around
multiple points, such as state capitals. To account for this I use a gravity
centered spatial index to measure the proximity of state populations to state
capitals – see Campante and Do (2013). This variable is a measure of the spatial
concentration of populations around state capitols.
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Modelling
I model the relationship described above using an OLS regression. The BrueschPagan test showed that multicollinearity was not a problem and the RESET tests
indicate that the models are specified. Obviously with 50 states, even with dual
verification requirements and two responses per state, a small N is an issue for
modeling considerations. To address the small N I rely on a standard 1,000
bootstrapped samples to estimate the standard errors – see Buchinsky (1995) and
Manly (2006) for a full description of this approach.
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Findings and Discussion
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Table 4.2. Predicting the Effectiveness of Regulations Overseeing the Governor
Model 1: Influence from Governor
Model 2: Influence from Legislature
boot σ
t
sig
boot σ
t
sig
β
σ
β
σ
(Intercept)
51.214
19.860
22.635
2.263
**
53.448
19.860
25.081
2.131 *
Governor's Influence
-7.756
10.801
3.86
-1.963
*
Legislature's Influence
6.506
12.360
4.169
1.561
Budget per Member
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.100
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.099
Staff per Member
-3.906
2.534
2.434
-1.605
-4.089
2.534
2.456
-1.665
Regulations Exist for Governor
0.273
0.133
0.127
2.156
*
0.274
0.133
0.126
2.182 *
Fulltime Commission
11.001
5.123
4.461
2.466
*
10.956
5.123
4.504
2.432 *
% Dem or Strong Dem
-44.492
29.870
36.389
-1.223
-47.700 29.870
40.271 -1.184
Spatial Factor
-5.552
23.100
27.618
-0.201
-7.029
23.100
28.870 -0.243
t-levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001)
R Sq
Adj R Sq
F
RESET
Breusch-Pagan

0.387
0.274
3.422 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom, p=.006
0.773, p=0.469
4.309, p=0.744

0.373
0.269
3.157 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom
0.444, p=0.645
3.443, p=0.841

In both models the effectiveness of monitoring the governor increases with appointment authority. This likely indicates that
the governor as a unitary actor cannot exercise his appointment powers to his own ends, but the legislature uses their power
to affect the oversight of the governor. Note that t-values are based on bootstrapped standard errors. – see Appendix D for

alternative models and robustness checks.
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Table 4.3. Predicting the Effectiveness of Regulations Overseeing the Legislature
Model 3: Influence from Governor
boot σ
t
sig
β
σ
(Intercept)
-15.496
17.720
22.187
-0.698
Governor's Influence
-6.213
5.630
5.724
-1.085
Legislature's Influence
Budget per Member
0.000
0.000
0.000
-0.790
Staff per Member
-1.513
2.426
3.800
-0.398
Regulations Exist for Legislature
-0.054
0.097
0.115
-0.468
Fulltime Commission
11.971
4.920
5.001
2.394
*
% Dem or Strong Dem
-15.975
28.630
35.980
-0.444
Spatial Factor
-5.022
21.930
24.763
-0.203

Model 4: Influence from Legislature
boot σ
t
sig
β
σ
-0.330
17.720
-0.680 0.486
0.680
0.000
2.735
0.067
17.254
32.289
16.776

3.169
0.000
2.426
0.097
4.920
28.630
21.930

0.089
2.735
0.701
17.254
32.289
16.776
24.481

7.635
0.000
3.902
0.004
0.534
1.925
0.685

***
***

.

t-levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001)
R Sq
Adj R Sq
F
RESET
Breusch-Pagan

0.319
0.194
2.007 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom
0.033, p=0.967
8.163, p=0.318

0.364
0.273
2.453 on 7 and 38 degrees of freedom
0.146, p=0.864
10.339, p=0.170

While the governor does not use his/her influence to affect oversight of the legislature, it appears that the legislature uses their
authority to their own ends, decreasing the effectiveness of monitoring via their appointment authority. Note that t-values
are based on bootstrapped standard errors. See Appendix D for alternative models and robustness checks.

Figure 4.1. Effectiveness of Regulations over Governor | Governor’s Influence
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Figure 4.2. Effectiveness of Regulations over Legislature | Legislature’s Influence

Findings for Oversight of the Governor
Table 4.2 shows the results from models testing the effects of political
influence on the effectiveness of regulations overseeing the governor. For every
one unit increase in the governor’s perceived political influence over the
commission, there was 7.576 unit increase in the respondent’s agreement that
oversight of executive branch conflicts of interest are effective. Note however
that there is no significant effect for the influence of the legislature. This
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supports the scrutiny evasion hypothesis; this is partly to be expected though.
As Krause and Woods (2012) note the relationship between the legislature and
executive, while potentially adversarial, is one where the legislature uses its
capacity to affect its preferred position. Of course they also note, when the
legislature has other means of achieving their preferred position, they tend to use
that method rather than overtly exerting their influence. The legislature may not
use their political influence to increase the effectiveness of commission oversight
of the executive simply because they do not need to do so. Legislatures have
more means of ensuring oversight of the executive than just influencing
decisions over the ethics commission. In any case, an overt attempt by a
legislator to use their influence over the commission to go after a governor may
backfire and be seen as overtly playing politics with a symbol of integrity (Smith
2011).
These findings provide some additional nuance to findings from
Rosenson (2003 and 2009). She found that legislators were more likely to pass
laws checking the executive than checking themselves. On average respondents
perceived the regulations overseeing the executive as more effective than those
regulating the legislature. Rosenson’s (2003) question was one of the practices of
the legislature regarding the types of laws they pass. In contrast, my findings
demonstrate that as a governor’s influence over the commission increases he/she
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will use that influence to weaken the regulations put on him/her by the
legislature.
An interesting finding is that having a fulltime commission contributes
significantly to the effectiveness of oversight regardless of whether the
commission oversees the legislature or executive. This supports the notion that
more professional commissions tend to be more insulated than commissions that
simply exist as sub-legislative or sub-executive entities. While there is a broad
body of literature on the ability of the political branches to influence the
bureaucracy, it appears that this influence is likely more prevalent in
commissions that exist as subsidiaries of the executive or legislative branch as
opposed to those that exist as separate agencies. One potential reason was noted
by both Rosenson (2006) and Mackenzie (2002). Ethics policies tend not to reflect
the true priorities of policymakers. This is because ethics policy targets the
policymakers as opposed to other policies such education policy or insurance
policy which target outside entities. Although not tested here, it would make
sense that fulltime, professional commissions would be more insulated from ex
ante or ex post retaliation than members of commissions that are simply a flow
through from political branches.
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Findings for Oversight of the Legislature
Looking at table 4.3 one can see that the influence of the legislature is
positively associated with the perceived effectiveness of monitoring the
legislature. This is consistent with the idea that legislators use the commission
not to check the executive but as a tool against political rivals. Although
individual legislators as targets were not examined here, the target of monitoring
was the legislature. Additionally there is no effect from the governor’s influence.
This implies that when it comes to the legislature, there is neither an inter-branch
adversarial relationship, nor an institutional desire to evade scrutiny – rather it
proposes that the desire is to harm opponents as opposed to protecting the
institution. The evidence then supports the idea that legislators do not utilize
institutional capacity as the legislature but act as individual legislators. I should
note that the total change in the perceived effectiveness of regulations for the
legislature is lower than the total change in the regulations overseeing the
executive. This is simply because regulations overseeing the legislature are seen
as being less effective in general. It is not the case though that the regulations
overseeing the legislature are seen as more effective than those overseeing the
executive. As such my findings do not imply that legislative controls engenders
more perceived effectiveness, merely that the corresponding change from
increases in legislative control is positive.
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Evidence supporting the Witch Hunt hypothesis within the legislature is
supported by another finding in Model 4. When it comes to the effectiveness of
regulations over the legislature, staff size matters. This makes sense though if
the legislature is using the commission as a means of going after rivals, e.g. as the
proportion of staffing to monitoring increases, then effectiveness should also
increase.
Findings for Controls
Lastly, this point about evading scrutiny coupled with discussions of the
governor as a figurehead gets back to well-worn arguments about the role of
information and citizen’s knowledge of politics. Obviously the average citizen is
not checking the ethics commission website on a daily basis to see who got fined,
where ethics trainings are taking place, or who is under investigation. They rely
on the media to break stories of political corruption for them. But that
understanding then questions the role and even the value of ethics commissions
in all of this. Does this mean then that ethics commissions are only minor actors
in exposing political scandals and the real exposure comes from robust media
coverage? Given the evidence here I would think the answer is, “No.”
My reason for this is that the spatial component was not significant.
Campante and Do (2013) previously demonstrated that proximity of population
centers to state capitals was positively associated with corruption convictions
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because of the increased market for stories on politics. This does not mean
though that more media coverage is inherent in more effective commissions.
Now it may be that commissions do not need to do as thorough an investigation
in a robust media market as they would in a weak media market – they may
simply plant the seed with an initial inquiry and let the journalists do the rest.
But this would mean that the commission’s effectiveness would be confounded
by media coverage which is partly what is seen here. The absence of an effect is
obviously difficult to interpret with any significant meaning, but given previous
findings around population centers and journalists, I think the connection
between media and societal trust in institutions is still an idea that merits further
exploration.
Potential Criticisms and Improvements
One point to note, and a potential criticism, is that from the above one
could ask whether exposing scandals is akin to effectiveness as opposed to the
idea that an effective ethics commission promotes ethical behavior (see e.g.
Garafolo and Guerass 2002 and Denhardt 1988). This is a potential criticism of
my analysis given that the respondents were journalists who may see more value
in exposing misdeeds rather than in ensuring that they do not occur. While
reporters as respondents are more informed than the general public, one cannot
deny that they may have a perception of effectiveness that is more geared
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towards exposure than education. I would note though that if this were strictly
the case then variable for the spatial distribution of populations around state
capitals should have been significant and positive. As noted in Campante and
Do (2013) larger population centers closer to government centers means that the
market for news is more geared to stories about politics (Campante and Do 2013;
Kenski, Hardy and Jamieson 2010). Although one may think that this makes the
reporting of scandals more likely as the population around state capitals
increases, Campante and Do (2013) found the opposite to be true. More secluded
state capitals tend to be more associated with corruption because, according to
Campante and Do, elected officials have less concern that they will be exposed
given that the media market is less geared towards politics. Given the lack of
effect in my model then, one cannot conclude that reporters’ responses are
rooted in a desire to sell more stories.

Discussion
What does all of this say about the effects of political influence over ethics
commissions and in turn the effectiveness of ethics commissions? First, it
appears that governors use their influence over ethics commissions as a means of
evading scrutiny. This is supported by the negative relationship between
perceived effectiveness overseeing the executive and political influence from the
governor’s office. I take this to mean that the respondents perceive the governor
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to be using his/her influence over the commission. I can make this claim because
influence was measured as a function of appointment authority. Additionally,
the fact that increases in the governor’s removal power are also associated with
decreases in perceived effectiveness means that the respondents perceive the
governor’s ability to remove, or threat to remove as a means through which the
governor can control the commission’s oversight of his office.
In this manuscript I have examined the correlates of perceived
effectiveness of regulations over the governor and over the legislature. My
analysis also supplements portions of the state politics literature which
examining legislative-executive relations. I find relatively strong evidence that
the governor seeks to behave as a principal and treat the commissioners as
agents. My findings for the legislature reinforce the idea that legislators delegate
authority based upon their own political desires as opposed to the institution’s
capacity.
The cross-state variation that I use in this manuscript provides good
complement to previous works addressing both ethics enforcement (Rosenson
2003; 2005; 2009; Smith 2003 ab; 2011; Lewis and Gilman 2012) as well as to
works on legislative-executive interaction (Krause and Woods 2012; McGrath
2012). The small sample size makes identifying the determinants of perceived
effectiveness more difficult, nevertheless I do find evidence of political influence
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over ethics commission activities. The fact that my findings diverge from
expectations about legislative-executive interactions in the bureaucracy supports
my initial proposition that ethics commissions are unique as bureaucratic
institutions.
My results are largely consistent with the ideas put forth by Rosenson
(2003), but extend her ideas into the functioning of commissions rather than just
their formation. Low perceptions of effectiveness in the presence of increased
political control are a sign of a weak institution. Although perceptions of
reporters per se do not provide a direct measure of commission activity, these
results do indicate that increased political influence located in a single individual
decreases the capacity of the commission to engage the governor as a neutral
actor.
These findings also lend credence to the idea that because influence is
diffuse in the legislature a principal-agent model is not sufficient. Moreover a
rational organizational model does not work either. Even though institutional
rationality would dictate that elected officials limit commissions through
oversight powers, individual political desires may influence individual
legislatures to use the commission against their rivals. Note that this is not tested
directly here but is implied by my findings.
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Finally, my analysis adds useful insights into how ethics commissions as
institutions may be designed to more effectively oversee elected officials. My
results reinforce the idea that concentrated political influence is detrimental for
effective monitoring. As such one suggestion would be to increase the number
of individuals with appointment authority to a commission. Glaeser and Saks
(2002) show that politicians should be concerned about corruption because it is
detrimental to investment in their states. As such the fact that legislators appear
to be behaving in a manner that is not institutionally rational may be a good
thing because it appears that corruption gets exposed to a greater degree.
However given that perceived effectiveness was generally lower in the
legislature it also appears that the respondents realize that legislators are acting
as self-interested individuals and not actually seeking out corruption for the sake
of ethicality.
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Chapter Five: Closing and Next Questions
My goal in this dissertation was to examine if and how political officials
influence ethics commissions as institutions. My study has revealed some
interesting findings. A key finding suggested by my research is that although
the legislative and executive branches both seek to influence ethics commissions
by controlling who sits on the commission, they do so with different goals in
mind. In addition, my results suggest that questions of staffing capacity and
budget capacity are only weakly associated with the perceived effectiveness of
commissions at monitoring elected officials’ conflicts of interest.
However this study has also raised some additional questions. For
example, what are the prospects for reforming commissions to achieve their
stated ideals: can structural changes to the institutions have any real impact on
the commissions, or are the interests of elected officials so entrenched that
substantive reforms are impossible? Finally, what does this say about the value
of ethics commissions? Can their decisions be considered legitimate given the
impacts of political influence on their perceived effectiveness; or are merely
symbolic organizations? In this final chapter I close with a consideration of the
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politics of ethics commissions, which includes a discussion of how a public
desire for signals of integrity (Smith 2011) has promoted commissions as
symbolic institutions.

Utilizing Commissions
A natural question in the discussion of political influence over ethics
commissions is whether commissioners have enough discretion to act on the
presumed goals of elected officials, i.e. to articulate ethics regulations? The
average citizen may take for granted that commissioners have discretion over
who/what to investigate. This is not to say that they have no discretion, rather
that they have less than the public believes and they may be loath to use what
little discretion they have given the recourse available to elected officials. In the
traditional administrative discretion literature there are concerns about whether
discretion is fully utilized by administrators, e.g. Peters (1996), Peters and Pierre
(1998), and Sowa and Selden (2003) argue that administrators may in fact have
limited discretion given the number of actors they must satisfy. However as
Peters (1996) and Coggburn et al (2010) note the rules of an institution offer a
sense of security and in turn they offer a veil behind which members of that
institution may hide in justifying their decisions. This is important in the
discussion of my findings since the rules of commissions as political institutions
grant significant recourse to elected officials over the institution that is meant to
125

regulate them. This turns the old saying qui custodiet ipsos custodes (who watches
the watchmen) on its head.
Rosenson (2003) demonstrated that commissions are established when
the new institution is not seen as a threat. I have demonstrated that elected
officials use their influence over commissions to different self-serving ends. Yet
to be discussed are the regulations empowering commissions. It makes sense
though that – given Rosenson’s findings and my own – the rules governing a
commission would also be designed to facilitate the types of decisions that allow
commissioners some cover for their decisions to investigate or not investigate
particular individuals. However one could also make the case that it really may
not matter what types of rules are in place if political influence is the
determining factor.
One can gain insight into this by examining the existence of rules
regarding the independence of commissions and comparing them to the
perceived independence of commissions. Several of the questions on the 2011
State Integrity Investigation (SII) address whether or not in law, commissions
are empowered with the authority to (1) independently investigate alleged
violations of state ethics; and (2) independently impose penalties on individuals
found guilty of state ethics rules. Every state that has an ethics commission,
with the exception of Michiganv, answered both questions affirmatively. Just
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knowing that respondents answered affirmatively to both questions in all but
one case but also knowing that there is wide variation in the perceived
independence of the commission we can say that simply having rules
empowering the commission to take action does not mean that the commission
will take action.
Such insights mean that any concerns over commissions not being
empowered to take action are likely overstated. However it still leaves opens at
least two questions around determining compliance with ethics regulations.
First, empowering regulations determine the processes a commission must
follow in adjudicating questions of compliance. Second, empowering
regulations also set boundaries for an institution and so this raises the question
of what a commission requires of the subjects of ethics regulations, e.g. the
stringency with which regulations are enforced. Compliant processes while
likely different from state-to-state may not matter if the effectiveness of
commissions is a function of how elected officials can shape commissions to
maintain influence over them. This is because political influence can be a factor
in either increasing regulations around the commission, or deregulating the
commission; in either case political influence is being manifested over a body
designed to regulate political action.
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Even though commissions have the legal capacity to act independently
they are still not free from political influence. Therefore if one changes the
number of rules that empower a commission, this will not change the fact that
they are still first subject to political influence. In fact decreasing the rules to
which commissioners are subject could exacerbate the problem. The reason for
this is that as noted by Peters (1996) and Coggburn et al (2010) rules can provide
potential cover. Elected officials will not likely ask a commissioner to allow
them to violate a regulation, the risk is simply too great for such overt action – a
similar argument to Laffont and Tirole (1991) as to why firms do not simply
bribe regulators. However if a commissioner assumes ex post consequences, or
ex ante, feels that they owe an elected official, they may more inclined look the
other way.

Commissions and the Importance of Symbols
Americans have a strong sense of distrust and cynicism towards
government (Dubnick 1994; Kellough 1998). Such observations are important in
discussing ethics commissions because one of the goals of commissions is to
provide a signal of accountability (Smith 2003ab; 2011). Commissions were born
of scandal and are direct effort to address the trust deficit between the public
and elected officials. Given my findings though, it appears that commissions
are deficient in providing meaningful accountability and serve primarily a
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symbolic purpose, i.e. they serve as a signal of integrity (Smith 2003). If
commission activities are directed towards one’s political rivals, or simply away
from oneself base on political influence then the accountability provided is not
meaningful in the sense of real oversight. Rather it is simply a recognition that
exposure by the commission is bad electorally and therefore it can be useful to
expose one’s rivals and harmful to have one's self exposed.
The public may be none the wiser as to how influence is being wielded
over a commission and moreover they simply may not care. It is well known
that the public’s knowledge of politics is severely lacking (Carpini, Jacobs and
Cook 2009; Franklin 2002; Campell 1960). The average citizen cannot identify
their own congressional representative (Popkin and Dimock 2009) let alone
recognize how political influence is wielded over the state ethics commission.
Even when the political maneuverings over the ethics commission are made
public, there may be no long term effects. For example after revelations of SC
Governor Nikki Haley’s influencing the SC Ethics Commission her approval
among the general public dropped below 50% to 41% (Cohen, 2013). However
among likely Republican voters her approval ratings remained high at 78%
(Huffmon 2014).
Notwithstanding a few instances of strong ethical oversight, e.g.
Connecticut fining unethical campaign bundlers $1.9 Million and Gov. Rick
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Perry (R-TX) being indicted for attempting to defund the Texas commission in
response to an investigation, the overall picture for commissions is not a pretty
one. Although states have taken steps to increase the strength of their
regulations around ethics and accountability in light of the embarrassing
findings of the State Integrity Investigation, many of these proposals have been
feckless or have died in committee. As discussed above though, even if
regulations had been passed it is not clear that much would really change given
the power of political influence over a commission. In short, given the political
influence to which commissions are subject, and the fact that the public seeks
assurances of integrity via the commission but does not recognize the political
influence to which the commissions are subject, commissions may be nothing
more than symbolic institutions.
Symbols have value to the degree that they are not explained (Campbell
1993). Indeed Edelman (1985: 56) argues that administrative agencies serve an
“expressive function” and provide a sense of legitimacy to the issues they were
designed to address. Ethics commissions are designed to address issues of
ethical oversight. The point is that ethics commissions could provide symbolic
“accountability” if the legitimacy of the commission as an institution were
questioned.
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Future Research
It is often said that good investigations raise as many questions as they
answer (Light and Pillemer 2009). Hopefully my analysis here has done just
that. I have provided the first analysis of political influence over the functions
of ethics commissions. This addresses a gap in the literature since most studies
to date have addressed the correlates for the creation of commissions, or the
internal workings of commissions (Rosenson 2003; 2005; 2009; Lewis and
Gilman 2012; Smith 2003 ab).
While my research has addressed some significant unanswered questions
in the study of ethics commissions, significant questions remain. For example,
to those who claim that legislators do not act against their own self-interest in
empowering commissions (Rosenson 2003), my results imply that such
calculations may be true for their creation but generalizing this to active
commission ignores the issue that legislators appear to use commissions to
expose political rivals. Others may be curious about how to design more
effective commissions and avoid the problems of political influence. There do
not appear to be inter-branch adversarial arrangements, but they were not
tested in isolation specifically because such exclusive arrangements do not exist.
My model points to a solution of commissions with quasi-judicial authority
(neutral arbiters) buffered by diffuse appointment powers and relatively secure
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tenure. Finally, additional research is needed to determine if socio-cultural
factors and what causal mechanisms (scandals and the like) are associated with
different types of commission designs.
These are just a few possibilities of future research. Readers will of
course have their own ideas and their own criticisms for what questions warrant
future investigation. Additionally no piece of research is perfect. One admitted
weakness of this dissertation is in the availability of data. Relying on the State
Integrity Investigation is nice because the methodology for recording and
measuring responses was thorough. In the end though the survey only records
single observations for each state. The bootstrapping required in my models
accounted for some of this but no statistical technique should be preferred to
additional data. Whatever the agenda topic though, there is a healthy research
agenda for the determinants of ethics commission activity as well as what is
perceived as ethical political behavior across the states. With an ever increasing
skepticism as to the motivation of politicians, a recognition by elected officials
that commissions and can affect their political fortunes, and what their actions
in this regard say about the legitimacy of oversight; it is imperative to continue
to search for how commissions are affected and how politicians may be made
more accountable.

132

References
Alesina, Alberto and Guido Tabellini. “Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A
Single Policy Task.” American Economic Review 97(1): 169-179.
Alt, James E. and David D. Lassen. 2003. The Political Economy of Institutions
and Corruption in American States. Journal of Theoretical Politics 15 (3),
341– 365.
Anechiarico, Frank and James Jacobs. 1996. The pursuit of absolute integrity: how
corruption control makes government ineffective. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1996.
Anechiarico, Frank. 2010. “Protecting Integrity at the Local Level: The Role of Anticorruption Agencies,” Crime, Law and Social Change 53(1): 79-95.
Araral, Eduardo. 2009. “The Strategic Games that Donors and Bureaucrats Play:
An Institutional and Rational Choice Analysis.” Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 19(4): 853-871.
Baumgartner, Frank R. Agendas and Instability in American Politics (Second
Edition). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010.
Behn, Robert D. 2003. “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require
Different Measures.” Public Administration Review 63(5): 586-606.
Bendor, Jonathan and Moe, Terry. 1985. “An Adaptive Model of Bureaucratic
Politics.” American Political Science Review 79(3): 755-774.
Bertelli, Anthony and Laurence Lynn. Madison’s Managers: Public Administration
and the Constitution. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2006.
Boylan, Richard T. and X. Cheryl Long. 2003. “A Survey of State House
Reporters’ Perception of Public Corruption.” State Politics and Policy
133

Quarterly 3 (4): 420-438.
Boyne, George, Michael Poole and Glenville Jenkins. 1999. “Human Resource
Management in the Public and Private Sectors: An Empirical Comparison.”
Public Administration 77(2): 407-420.
Campante, Fillipe and Quang T. Do 2013. "Isolated Capital Cities,
Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from US States.” NBER
Working Papers 19027, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Canes-Wrone, Brandice, William Howell and David E. Lewis. 2008. "Toward a
Broader Understanding of Presidential Power: A Reevaluation of the
Two Presidencies Thesis." Journal of Politics 70(1): 1-16.
Carpenter, Daniel P. The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks,
and Policy Innovation in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton, University Press, 2001.
Carpenter, Daniel P. 1996. “Adaptive Signal Processing, Hierarchy, and
Budgetary Control in Federal Regulation,” American Political Science
Review 90(2): 106-147.
Caselli, Francesco and Massimo Morelli. 2004. “Bad Politicians.” Journal of Public
Economics 88(4): 759-782.
Caughey, Devin, Sarah Chatfield and Adam Cohon. 2009. “Defining, Mapping,
and Measuring Bureaucratic Autonomy.” Presented at the 2009 Annual
Conference of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL,
April 6.
Christensen, Jorgen,G. “Bureaucratic autonomy as a political asset.” In B. Guy
Peters and J. Pierre (eds.): Politicians, Bureaucrats and Administrative
Reform. London: Routledge. 2001.
Cohen, Dara K., Mario F. Cuelar and Barry R. Weingast. 2006. “Crisis
Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design of Legal
Mandates.” Stanford Law Review 59(3). Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=926516
Comlossy, Megan. 2011. “Ethics Commissions: Representing the Public
Interest.” National Council of State Legislatures, Center for Ethics in
134

Government. Available at:
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/lsss/Ethics_Commissions.pdfSmith
2003a
Cox and Matthew D. McCubbins. Legislative leviathan: Party government in the
House. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2007
Denhardt, Janet V. The Ethics of Public Service: Resolving Moral Dilemmas in Public
Organizations, Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Inc., 1988.
Denhardt, Kathryn G. and Stuart C. Gilman. 2002. “Extremism in the Search for
Virtue. Why Zero Gift Policies Spawn Unintended Consequences.” Public
Integrity 4(1):75–80.
DiMaggio, Paul J. and Walter W. Powell. 1983. “The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational
Fields. American Sociological Review 48(1): 147-160.
Dubnick, Melvin J. "A Coup Against King Bureaucracy?" In J. J. Dilulio, Jr. (ed.).
Deregulating the Public Service: Can Government Be Improved? Washington,
DC: The Brookings Institute, 1994.
Edelman, Murray J. The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana-Champagne, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 1985.
Egeberg, Morten and Jarle Trondal. 2009. “National Agencies in the European
Administrative Space: Government Driven, Commission Driven, or
Networked?” Public Administration 87(4): 779-790.
Ellinas, Antonis A. and Ezra Suleiman. The European Commission and Bureaucratic
Autonomy: Europe’s Custodians. New York: Cambridge University Press.
2012
Epstein, David and Sharyn O’Halloran. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost
Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers. New York:
Cambridge University Press. 1999
Fukuyama, Francis. 2012. “What is Governance?” Center for Global
Development, Working Paper 314. Available at:
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/full_text/workingPapers/1426906/What-IsGovernance.html
135

Geuras, Dean and Charles Garofalo. Practical Ethics in Public Administration.
Vienna, VA: Management Concepts. 2002.
Gilman, Carol W. and Stuart C. Denhardt. The Ethics Challenge in Public Service: A
Problem Solving Guide. San Francisco, CA: Wiley and Sons, Inc. 2002
Glaeser, Edmund and Raven E. Saks. 2006. “Corruption in America.” Journal of
Public Economics 90(2006): 1053-1072.
Goodman, Marshall, Timothy J. Holp, and Karen M. Ludwig. (1996).
“Understanding State Legislative Ethics Reform.” Public Integrity
Annual1: 51-57.
Hale, George E. 2013. “State Budgets, Governors, and Their Influence On ‘BigPicture Issues’: A Case Study of Delaware Governor Pete Du Pont 19771985.” Administration and Society: Available online at:
http://aas.sagepub.com/content/early/2013/03/11/0095399713479437.abstr
act
Hammond, Thomas H. and Jack Knott (1996. “Who Controls the Bureaucracy?:
Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and
Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional PolicyMaking.” Journal of Law Economics and Organization 12(1): 119-166.
Herrmann, Frederick M. 1997. “Bricks without Straw: The Plight of Government
Ethics Agencies in the United States.” Public Integrity Annual 1(1): 13-22.
Hu, Shuhua. Akaike Information Criterion. Center for Research in Scientific
Computation. Raleigh, NC. NC State University. 2007.
Huber John D. and Charles R. Shipan. Deliberate Discretion: The Institutional
Foundations of Bureaucratic Autonomy. New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2002.
Hurvich, Clifford M. and Chih-Ling Tsai. 1989. “Regression and Time Series
Model Selection in Small Samples.” Biometrika 76(2): 297-307.
Kies, Hillary J. 2012. “Preston v. Leake: Applying the Appropriate Standard of
Review to North Carolina’s Campaign Contributions Ban.” Wake Forest
136

Law Review. 47 Wake Forest L. Rev. 876. Available at:
http://wakeforestlawreview.com/preston-v-leake-applying-theappropriate-standard-of-review-to-north-carolina%E2%80%99scampaign-contributions-ban
Kim, Doo Rae. 2008. “Political Control and Bureaucratic Autonomy Revisited: A
Multi-Institutional Analysis of OSHA Enforcement. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory 18(1): 33-55.
Kingdon, John. Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policies. Boston: Pearson, 1995.
Krause, George A. 2009. “Organizational Complexity and Coordination
Dilemmas in U.S. Executive Politics.” Presidential Studies Quarterly
39(March): 74–88.
Krause, George and Woods, Neal. “Policy Delegation, Comparative
Institutional Capacity, and Administrative Politics in the American
States.” in Donald P. Haider–Markel, (ed.). The Oxford Handbook of State
and Local Government. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Jean Tirole. 1991. “The Politics of Government
Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture.” The Quarterly Journal
of Economics 106(4): 1089-1127.
Lerner, Jennifer S. and Philip E. Tetlock. 1999. “Accounting for the Effects of
Accountability.” Psychological Bulletin 125(2): 255-275.
Lewis, Carol W. and Gilman, Stuart C. The Ethics Challenge in Public
Administration: A Problem Solving Guide. New York: John Wiley & Sons,
2012
Lewis, David E. The politics of presidential appointments: Political Control and
Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Lipset, Seymour M. and William Schneider. The Confidence Gap: Business, Labor,
and Government in the Public Mind. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987.
Mackenzie, G. Calvin. Scandal Proof: Do Ethics Laws Make Government Ethical?
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institute Press, 2002.
137

McCubbins, Matthew. 1989. “Structure and Process as Solutions to the
Politician’s Principal Agency Problem.” Virginia Law Review 74, 431-482.
McCubbins, Matthew D. and Thomas Schwartz. 1984. “Congressional Oversight
Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms.” American Journal of
Political Science 28(1): 165-179.
Malatesta, Deanna and Craig R. Smith. 2011. “Resource Dependence,
Alternative Supply Sources, and the Design of Formal Contracts.” Public
Administration Review 71(4): 608-617.
Meier, Kenneth J. and Holbrooke, Thomas M. 1992. "I Seen My Opportunities
and I Took 'em: Political Corruption in the American States." Journal of
Politics 54(1): 135-155.
Menzel, Don and J. Edwin Benton. 1991. “Ethics Complaints and Local
Government: The Case of Florida.” Journal of Public Administration
Research and Theory 1(4): 419-436.
Menzel, Don. 1996. “Ethics Complaint Making and Trustworthy Government," Public
Integrity Annual. 1996:73-82.
Menzel, Don. 2005. “Research on Ethics and Integrity in Governance: A Review
and Assessment.” Public Integrity 7(2): 147-168.
Menzel, Donald. Ethics Management for Public Administrators. Armonk, NY: M.E.
Sharpe. 2007
Mitnick, Barry M. “The Theory of Agency and Organizational Analysis.” In
Bowie, N. and Freeman, R. (eds.) Ethics and Agency Theory: An
Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Moe, Terry. "The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public
Bureaucracy." 1990. In Oliver E. Williamson, ed., Organization Theory:
From Chester Barnard to the Present and Beyond. Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press.
Moran, Mark and Barry Weingast. 1983. “Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade
138

Commission.” Journal of Political Economy 91(5): 765-800.
Morgan, Peter W., and Glenn H. Reynolds. 1997. The Appearance of Impropriety.
New York: Free Press.
Niemi, Richard, Harold W. Stanley and Ronald Vogel. 1995. “State Economies
and State taxes: Do Voters hold Governors Accountable.” American
Journal of Political Science 394: 936-957.
Pellizo, Riccuardo and Rick Stapenhurst. Tools for Legislative Oversight: An
Empirical Investigation. New York. World Bank, 2004.
Pfeifer, Jeffrey and Gerald R. Salancik. The External Control of Organizations: A
Resource Dependence Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
2003.
Redlawsk, D. and James McCann. 2005. “Popular Interpretations of Corruption
and their Partisan Consequences.” Political Behavior 27(3): 261-283.
Robert, Christian P. and Casella, George. 2009. Introducing Monte Carlo
Methods with R. Available at:
http://www.stat.ufl.edu/archived/casella/ShortCourse/MCMC-UseR.pdf
Rohr, John. 1989. Public Administration, Executive Power & Constitutional
Confusion. Public Administration Review 49(2): 108-114.
Rosenson, Beth A. 2003. “Against their Apparent Self-Interest: The
Authorization of Independent State Legislative Ethics Commissions,
1973-96.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 31: 42-65.
Rosenson, Beth A. 2005. Costs and benefits of ethics laws. International Public
Management Journal 8(2): 209-224.
Rosenson, Beth. The Shadowlands of Conduct: Ethics and State Politics. Washington,
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2006.
Rosenson, Beth A. 2009. “The Effect of Political Reform Measures on
Perceptions of Corruption.” Election Law Journal: Rule, Politics and Policy
81: 31-46.

139

Rotberg, Robert, I. “Good Governance Means Performance and Results.”
Governance 27(3): 511-518.
Scheffey, Thomas. 2002. “Ethics Prosecutor in Pivotal Role.” The Connecticut Law
Tribune (August 2, 2002). Available at:
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=900005375002&slreturn=201310071
05835
Selznick, Phillip. 1996. “Institutionalism ‘Old’ and ‘New.” Administrative Science
Quarterly 41(2): 270-277.
Sharfman, Mark, P., Gerrit Wolf, Richard Chase and David Tanisk. 1988.
“Antecedents of Organizational Slack.” Academy of Management Review
13(4): 601-614.
Smith, Robert W. 2003a. “Enforcement of ethical capacity: Considering the Role
of State Ethics Commissions at the Millennium.” Public Administration
Review 63(3): 283-295.
Smith, Robert W. 2003b. “Corporate Ethics Officers and Government Ethics
Administrators: Comparing Apples to Oranges or Lessons to be
Learned.” Administration and Society 34(6): 632-652.
Smith, Robert W. 2011. Quoted by Rachel Bradley, “Why we Need Ethics
Commissions.” Georgia Common Cause. July 22, 2011. Available at:
http://commoncausega.org/2011/07/22/why-we-need-ethics-commissions/
Snyder, Susan and Barry Weingast. 2000. “The American System of Shared
Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB.” Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization 16(2): 269-305.
Squire, Peverill. 2007. “Measuring State Legislative Professionalism: The Squire
Index Revisited.” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 7(2): 211-227.
Svara, Jim. The Ethics Primer for Public Administrators in Government and Nonprofit
Organizations. Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett Publishers, 2007.
Tolchin, Susan J. and Martin Tolchin. Glass Houses: Congressional Ethics and the
Politics of Venom. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2001.
140

Vigoda-Gadot, Eran. 2007. "Citizens' Perceptions of Organizational Politics and
Ethics in Public Administration: A Five-Year Study of Their Relationship
to Satisfaction with Services, Trust in Governance, and Voice
Orientations." Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 17(1):
285-305.
Waterman and Meier 1998. “Principal-Agent Models: An Expansion?” Journal
of Public Administration Research and Theory. 8(2): 173-202.
White, Harry C. 1985. “Agency as Control. In Principals as Agents: The Structure
of Business, ed. Pratt, John W. and Richard Zeckhauser, R. Boston, MA:
Harvard Business Review Press.
Whitford, Andrew B. 2005. “The Pursuit of Political Control by Multiple Principles.”
Journal of Politics 67(1): 28-49.
Wilson, James Q. Bureaucracy: What Government Does and Why They Do It. New
York: Basic Books. 1989.
Wood, B. Dan. 1988. “Principals, Bureaucrats, and Clean Air Enforcement.” The
American Political Science Review 81(1): 213-234.
Wood, Dan and Richard Waterman. 1991. “The Dynamics of Political Control of
the Bureaucracy.” American Political Science Review 85(3): 801-828.
Yeilkagit, Kustal. 2004. “The Design of Public Agencies: Overcoming Agency
Costs and Commitment.” Public Administration and Development 24(2):
119-127.
Yesilkagit, Kustal and Sandra van Thiel. 2008. Political Influence and
Bureaucratic Autonomy. Public Organization Review 8(1): 137-153.

141

Appendix A: Partial Proportional Odds Model
The ordered logistic regression assumes proportional odds, i.e. that the slopes,
while nonlinear, are at least parallel. Often this assumption is violated, but the
ordered logistic regression is used nonetheless. To test the parallel lines
assumption one can rely on the Brant test, which is a likelihood ratio test
between a standard ordered logit and the ordered logit with the dependent
variables allowed to vary across categories (in seeming violation of the
assumption of parallel lines) – see also Peterson and Harrell (1980). If the
second model has a significant chi-square value as compared to the original
model then the parallel lines assumption is violated and an ordered logit is not
to be preferred. For technical specification see the demonstration below:

The partial proportional odds model can be written as

()* ? @.  ABCDE F 

exp )JE K CDE .
1 K LexpBJE K C DE FM

, @  1,2, … , O P 1

Where M –s the number of categories of an ordinal dependent variable. So the
probability of Y will take on each of the values 1,…,M equals
()*  1.  1 P A)C D+ .
()*  1.  1 P A)C D+ . P ABC DE F, @  2, … , O P 1
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()*  O.  1 P A)C D;,+ .
Wolfe and Gould (1998) show that the ordered logit is actually a special case of
the partial proportional odds model. The formulas are the same, save the fact
that the ordered logit all of the DQ are the same for each value of @ but not the
J R  (Williams 2006), e.g.

()* ? @.  A)CD. 

exp )JE K CD.
1 K LexpBJE K C DFM

, @  1,2, … , O P 1

The partial proportional odds model allows for the DQ to be the same or
different for each category. Note that this could not be accomplished by other
models such as a multinomial logit. This is because the multinomial logit will
generate many more parameters because the multinomial logit frees all
variables, when in fact the parallel lines assumption may only be violated by a
few of the variables. The partial proportional odds model cleans this up by
relaxing the assumption of proportional odds only for those variables where the
assumption is violated.
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Appendix B: Robustness Checks for Models in Chapter Three
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Table B.1. Robustness checks using models with only Budget per Issue and only Staff per Issue
MODEL 3
MODEL 4
boot σ
z
sig
boot σ
z
β
β
(Intercept):1
2.585
0.786
3.287
**
2.955
0.764
3.870
(Intercept):2
1.598
0.781
2.046
*
1.973
0.759
2.598
(Intercept):3
0.372
0.776
0.479
0.746
0.756
0.987
(Intercept):4
-1.509 0.774
-1.949
-1.136 0.753
-1.508
Budget per Issue
1.379
0.280
4.931
***
1.167
0.265
4.396
Staff per Issue Handled

0.108

0.053

2.031

**

Legislature's Appointment Authority
-4.209
Governor's Appointment Authority
-1.955
Removal Power
-0.257
Independence of Budget
0.191
Economic Interests
0.400
Average State Income
0.000
% Dem or Strong Dem
3.062
Legislature is Monitored x Leg Appointment
Legislature is Monitored x Gov Appointment
Legislature is Monitored
Issues Alone
Z Levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001)

0.411
0.302
0.051
0.182
0.132
0.000
0.940

-10.238
-6.480
-5.015
1.047
3.030
-3.250
3.257

***
***
***

Residual deviance

128.712

**
**
**

-4.199
-1.900
-0.249
0.340
0.492
0.000
2.461

0.408
0.301
0.050
0.156
0.128
0.000
0.877

-10.292
-6.313
-4.929
2.181
3.834
-2.886
2.805

128.871

sig
***
**

β
4.420
3.445
2.197
0.354

MODEL 5
boot σ
z
0.681
6.488
0.674
5.109
0.668
3.289
0.664
0.533

0.205
-3.764
-1.631
-0.284
0.091
0.331
0.000
3.240

0.051
0.406
0.297
0.051
0.182
0.131
0.000
0.939

sig
***
***
**

***
***
***
***
**
***
**
**

4.048
-9.260
-5.487
-5.566
0.499
2.519
-4.168
3.449

129.784

***
***
***
***
**
***
**

AIC
154.712
152.876
153.784
BIC
178.484
174.819
175.728
Log-likelihood
-64.356
-64.438
-64.892
LR test versus Saturated Model
3.382
7.541
6.632
DF
171
172
172
Model 3 is the full model from the text. Model 4 shows that the coefficients do not change significantly when Staff per Issue is removed, likewise
Model 5 shows that the coefficient do not change significantly when Budget per Issue is removed. This indicates that Model 3 is robust to these
changes and the fact that Staff per Issue is significant in Model 3 but not Model 2 is a function of the functional form of Financial Capacity and that
this form is preferred.
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Table B.2. Robustness Checks using full model with interaction terms and model w/o Budget or Staff variables
MODEL 6
boot σ
z
sig
β
β
(Intercept):1
0.223
0.823
0.271
3.523
(Intercept):2
-0.925
0.820
-1.127
2.549
(Intercept):3
-2.318
0.820
-2.828
**
1.316
(Intercept):4
-4.327
0.823
-5.259
***
-0.543
Budget per Issue
1.224
0.284
4.316
***
Staff per Issue Handled
-0.126
0.065
-1.949
Legislature's Appointment Authority
-1.974
0.637
-3.101
**
-3.948
Governor's Appointment Authority
1.470
0.514
2.856
**
-1.762
Removal Power
-0.074
0.056
-1.324
-0.266
Independence of Budget
0.751
0.203
3.699
***
0.221
Economic Interests
0.664
0.139
4.789
***
0.388
Average State Income
0.000
0.000
-2.750
**
0.000
% Dem or Strong Dem
1.729
1.033
1.674
3.013
Legislature is Monitored x Leg Appointment
-2.384
0.929
-2.565
**
Legislature is Monitored x Gov Appointment
-3.991
0.668
-5.975
***
Legislature is Monitored
3.653
0.309
11.821
***
Issues Alone
0.107
Z Levels: *1.960 (0.05); **2.576 (0.01); ***3.291(0.001)
Residual deviance
AIC
BIC
Log-likelihood
LR test versus Saturated Model
DF

122.798
154.798
184.056
-61.399
13.618
168

MODEL 7
boot σ
0.775
0.769
0.764
0.759

z
4.548
3.314
1.723
-0.715

sig
***
***

0.405
0.301
0.050
0.155
0.126
0.000
0.872

-9.743
-5.850
-5.294
1.426
3.076
-3.533
3.456

***
***
***
**
***
***

0.045

2.391

*

129.526
153.526
175.471
-64.673
6.891
172

Model 6 shows the coefficients when adding the interaction terms for monitoring the legislature and Model 7 shows the coefficients when only
accounting for the Issues per Commission without regard for Staffing of Budget.

APPENDIX C: Robustness Checks for Models in Chapter Four
Table C.1. Robustness Checks for Legislative Effectiveness Model
MODEL 1
MODEL 2
MODEL 3 MODEL 4
β (σ)
β (σ)
β (σ)
β (σ)
(Intercept)
4.522
9.220
9.765
11.186
(18.190)
(32.290)
(17.605)
(19.629)
Legislature's Influence
6.995
6.126
8.037
9.299
(13.100)
(13.530)
(12.738)
(12.743)
Governor's Influence
3.253
2.341
5.640
7.251
(9.178)
(9.637)
(9.391)
(9.232)
Budget per Member
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
Budget per Issue
-8.707
-7.711
(8.278)
(9.288)
Staff per Member
1.905
2.090
2.040
(2.541)
(2.617)
(2.442)
Staff per Issue
0.517
(0.749)
Regs Exist
0.056
0.054
0.090
0.108
(0.100)
(0.104)
(0.102)
(0.100)
Fulltime Commission
17.140
16.520
15.233
15.064
(5.142)
(5.373)
(5.303)
(5.720)
% Dem of Strong Dem
20.080
24.520
21.473
16.322
(29.000)
(36.970)
(28.281)
(28.014)
Spatial Factor
20.500
25.760
21.583
21.966
(22.390)
(26.570)
(22.027)
(22.207)
% >25 w/College +
-30.050
(50.210)
Religiosity
0.015
(31.370)

R Squared
Adjusted R Squared
AIC

0.326
0.179
374.933

0.333
0.142
379.567

0.335
0.201
376.267

0.329
0.177
375.617

Note the model in the text includes boostrapped standard errors. Because my
concern here is with the coefficients I did not bootstratp the standard errors.
The results show that my model is robust to the addition of other variables and
that the functional form of my budget and staffing measures provide slightly
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better leverage than alternatives.

Table C.2. Robustness Checks for Gubernatorial Effectiveness Model
MODEL 5
MODEL 6
MODEL 7 MODEL 8
β (σ)
β (σ)
β (σ)
β (σ)
(Intercept)
60.520
59.241
6.130
63.742
(21.190)
(20.822)
(33.990)
(22.974)
Legislature's Influence
-28.030
-24.558
-31.590
-26.189
(14.390)
(14.198)
(13.880)
(14.143)
Governor's Influence
-14.890
-12.804
-11.590
-14.312
(10.040)
(10.353)
(9.924)
(10.160)
Budget per Member
0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
Budget per Issue
-5.047
-8.999
(6.404)
(7.874)
Staff per Member
-2.398
-2.822
-2.520
(2.780)
(2.700)
(2.701)
Staff per Issue
-1.671
(1.829)
Regs Exist
0.402
0.408
0.350
0.383
(0.140)
(0.142)
(0.143)
(0.140)
Fulltime Commission
10.870
10.280
9.089
11.533
(5.560)
(5.756)
(5.461)
(6.177)
% Dem of Strong Dem
-44.900
-38.680
-19.720
-36.377
(31.520)
(31.380)
(27.860)
(31.149)
Spatial Factor
5.756
3.964
5.444
3.474
(24.780)
(24.656)
(37.470)
(24.746)
% >25 w/College +
13.200
(53.590)
Religiosity
73.440
(32.020)
R Squared
Adjusted R Squared
AIC

0.336
0.192
384.587

0.335
0.194
384.628

0.424
0.259
384.032

0.331
0.186
384.938

Note the model in the text includes boostrapped standard errors. Because my
concern here is with the coefficients I did not bootstratp the standard errors.
The results show that my model is robust to the addition of other variables and
that the functional form of my budget and staffing measures provide slightly
better leverage than alternatives.
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Appendix D: State Integrity Investigation Questionnaire
Public Access to Information
Do citizens have a legal right of access to information?
In law, citizens have a right of access to government information and basic
government records.
In law, citizens have a right of appeal if access to a basic government record is
denied.
In law, there is an established institutional mechanism through which citizens can
request government records.
In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the application of access to
information laws and regulations.
Is the right of access to information effective?
In practice, state agencies and government officials are not exempt from access to
information laws.
In practice, citizens receive responses to access to information requests within a
reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can use the access to information mechanism at a reasonable
cost.
In practice, responses to information requests are of high quality.
In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to access to information requests within a
reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can resolve appeals to information requests at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the government gives reasons for denying an information request.
In practice, when necessary, the agency that monitors the application of access to
information laws and regulations independently initiates investigations.
In practice, when necessary, the agency that monitors the application of access to
information laws and regulations imposes penalties on offenders.
Political Financing
Are there regulations governing the financing of political parties?
In law, there are limits on individual donations to political parties.
In law, there are limits on corporate donations to political parties.
In law, there are limits on donations from political action committees to political
parties.
In law, there are limits on lobbyists' donations to political parties.
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of individual donations to political
parties.
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In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties by
corporations.
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to political parties by
political action committees.
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the finances of
political parties when financial irregularities are uncovered.
In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of political parties.
Are there regulations governing the financing of individual political candidates?
In law, there are limits on individual donations to political candidates.
In law, there are limits on corporate donations to individual political candidates.
In law, there are limits on donations from political action committees to individual
political candidates.
In law, legislators are prohibited from the personal use of campaign contributions.
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political
candidates.
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political
candidates from corporations.
In law, there are requirements for the disclosure of donations to individual political
candidates from political action committees.
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the campaign
finances of individual political candidates when irregularities are uncovered.
In law, there is an agency or entity that monitors the financing of individual political
candidates' campaigns.
In law, there are limits on lobbyists' donations to individual candidates.
Are the regulations governing the political financing of parties effective?
In practice, the limits on individual donations to political parties are effective in
regulating an individual's ability to financially support a political party.
In practice, the limits on corporate donations to political parties are effective in
regulating a company's ability to financially support a political party.
In practice, the limits on donations to political parties by political action committees
are effective in regulating the organization's ability to financially support a political
party.
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political
parties independently initiates investigations.
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of political
parties imposes penalties on offenders.
In practice, contributions to political parties are audited.
In practice, individuals, corporations, or political action committees do not resort to
"astroturfing" -- defined here as the financial support of a political party or
individual using mechanisms designed to give the appearance of a grassroots
movement -- to bypass limits on political financing.
In practice, the limits on lobbyist donations to political parties are effective in
regulating a lobbyist's ability to financially support a political party.
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Are the regulations governing the political financing of individual candidates
effective?
In practice, the limits on individual donations to political candidates are effective in
regulating an individual's ability to financially support a particular candidate.
In practice, the limits on corporate donations to individual candidates are effective
in regulating a company's ability to financially support a candidate.
In practice, the limits on political action committee donations to individual
candidates are effective in regulating the political action committee's ability to
financially support a candidate.
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of
individual candidates' campaigns independently initiates investigations.
In practice, when necessary, an agency or entity monitoring the financing of
individual candidates' campaigns imposes penalties on offenders.
In practice, the finances of individual candidates' campaigns are audited.
In practice, the limits on lobbyists' donations to individual candidates are effective in
regulating lobbyists' ability to financially support an individual candidate.
Can citizens access records related to the financing of political parties?
In practice, political parties disclose data relating to financial support and
expenditures within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties within a
reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of political parties at a reasonable
cost.
In practice, the publicly available records of political parties' finances are of high
quality.
In practice, the publicly available records of political parties' finances are accessible
to the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner.
Can citizens access records related to the financing of individual candidates'
campaigns?
In practice, individual political candidates disclose data relating to financial support
and expenditures within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates (their
campaign revenues and expenditures) within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access the financial records of individual candidates at a
reasonable cost.
In practice, the publicly available records of political candidates' campaign finances
are of high quality.
In practice, the publicly available records of political candidates' finances are
accessible to the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner.
Executive Accountability
Can the chief executive be held accountable for his/her actions?
In practice, the governor gives reasons for his/her policy decisions.
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In law, the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials are prohibited from using
state funds for personal purposes.
In practice, the regulations preventing the governor and/or state cabinet-level
officials from using state funds for personal purposes are effective.
In law, the judiciary can review the actions of the executive.
In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews the actions of the executive.
In practice, the governor limits the use of executive orders to establishing new
regulations, policies, or government practices.
Is the executive leadership subject to criminal proceedings?
In law, the governor can be prosecuted for crimes he/she commits.
In law, state cabinet-level officials can be prosecuted for crimes they commit.
In practice, the governor is prosecuted for crimes she/he commits.
In practice, state cabinet-level officials are prosecuted for crimes they commit.
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch (defined
here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials)?
In law, the governor is required to file a regular asset disclosure form.
In law, state cabinet-level officials are required to file a regular asset disclosure form.
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of
the executive branch.
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of executive branch
asset disclosure forms (defined here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials).
In law, the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials are prohibited from the
personal use of campaign contributions.
In law, there are restrictions on the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials
setting up non-profit organizations (e.g. community groups, think tanks) that can be
used to reward political supporters and/or evade campaign finance rules.
In law, there are regulations for the disclosure of non-profit organizations (CSOs,
think tanks, etc.) set up by the governor and/or state cabinet-level officials.
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) amongst members of the
executive branch.
In law, there are restrictions on governors and/or state cabinet-level officials entering
the private sector after leaving the government.
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest by the executive branch (defined
here as governors and/or cabinet-level officials) effective?
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment
for governors and/or state cabinet-level officials are effective.
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the
executive branch are effective.
In practice, executive branch asset disclosures (defined here as governors and/or
cabinet-level officials) are audited.
In practice, the regulations preventing the governor and/or state cabinet-level
152

officials from using campaign contributions for personal purposes are effective.
In practice, executive branch actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on
nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the governor and the state
cabinet?
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or state
cabinet-level officials.
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or
state cabinet-level officials within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or
state cabinet-level officials at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the governor and/or state cabinet-level
officials are of high quality.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the governor and/or state
cabinet-level officials are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and
accessible manner.
In practice, official government functions are kept separate and distinct from the
functions of the ruling political party.
Legislative Accountability
Can members of the legislature be held accountable for their actions?
In law, legislators are prohibited from the personal use of public funds.
In practice, the regulations preventing legislators from using public funds for
personal purposes are effective.
In law, the judiciary can review laws passed by the legislature.
In practice, when necessary, the judiciary reviews laws passed by the legislature.
In law, are members of the state legislature subject to criminal proceedings?
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the state
legislature?
In law, members of the state legislature are required to file an asset disclosure form.
In law, there are restrictions for state legislators entering the private sector after
leaving the government.
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of
the state legislature.
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure
forms of members of the state legislature.
Are regulations governing conflicts of interest by members of the state legislature
effective?
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment
for state legislators are effective.
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to state legislators
are effective.
In practice, state legislative branch asset disclosures are audited.
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In law, there are restrictions on legislators setting up non-profit organizations (e.g.
community groups, think tanks) that can be used to reward political supporters
and/or evade campaign finance rules.
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), and patronage
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) in the hiring of legislative
staff.
In practice, legislative branch actions related to the hiring, firing, and promotion of
legislative staff are not based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the state legislature?
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the state
legislature.
In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records within a
reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access legislative asset disclosure records at a reasonable
cost.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the state legislature are of
high quality.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the state legislature are
accessible to the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner.
Can citizens access legislative processes and documents?
In law, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents.
In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents -defined as summaries of legislative proposals, debates, votes, and official actions -within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access records of legislative processes and documents -defined as summaries of legislative proposals, debates, votes, and official actions -at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the records of legislative processes and documents are accessible to the
public online in a meaningful and accessible manner.
In practice, the legislative process is sufficiently transparent to allow citizens/ CSOs
to monitor the legislative process and provide input or changes to bills.
Judicial Accountability
Is the process for selecting state-level judges transparent and accountable?
In law, there is a transparent procedure for selecting state-level judges. State-level
judges are defined as judges who have powers that derive from a state law or
constitution; are nominated/appointed by a state governmental body (state
legislature or executive); and/or are elected state-wide.
In practice, professional criteria are followed in selecting state-level judges.
In law, there is a confirmation process for state-level judges (i.e. conducted by the
legislature or an independent body).
Can members of the judiciary be held accountable for their actions?
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In law, judges are prohibited from the personal use of campaign contributions.
In practice, the regulations preventing judges from using campaign contributions for
personal purposes are effective.
In law, judges are prohibited from the personal use of state funds.
In practice, the regulations preventing judges from using state funds for personal
purposes are effective.
In law, members of the state-level judiciary are required to give reasons for their
decisions.
In practice, members of the state-level judiciary give reasons for their decisions.
In law, there is a disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) for the state-level
judicial system.
In law, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent mechanism) is protected from
political interference.
In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent
mechanism) initiates investigations.
In practice, when necessary, the judicial disciplinary agency (or equivalent
mechanism) imposes penalties on offenders.
In law, there is a process in place to evaluate the performance of judges who are up
for retention or reelection.
In law, citizens can access the performance evaluations of judges who are up for
retention or reelection.
In practice, judges' performance evaluations are made available for the public to
review.
In law, citizens can access court administrative records.
In practice, court decisions and opinions are made readily available to the public.
In practice, court decisions and opinions are accessible to the public online in a
meaningful and accessible manner.
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest for the state-level judiciary?
In law, members of the state-level judiciary are required to file an asset disclosure
form.
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of
the state-level judiciary.
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure
forms of members of the state-level judiciary.
In law, there are restrictions for state-level judges entering the private sector after
leaving the government.
In law, there are requirements for state-level judges to recuse themselves from cases
in which they may have a conflict of interest.
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest for the state-level judiciary
effective?
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment
for state-level judges are effective.
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the
155

state-level judiciary are effective.
In practice, state-level judiciary asset disclosures are audited.
In practice, the requirements for state-level judges to recuse themselves from cases in
which they may have a conflict of interest are effective.
In law, there are restrictions on state judges setting up non-profit organizations (e.g.
community groups and think tanks) that can be used to reward political supporters
and/or evade campaign finance rules.
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), or patronage
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) amongst members of the
judicial branch.
In practice, judicial branch actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not based on
nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of members of the state-level
judiciary?
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of members of the state-level
judiciary.
In practice, citizens can access state-level judiciary members' asset disclosure records
within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access state-level judiciary members' asset disclosure records
at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the state-level judiciary are of high
quality.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the state-level judiciary are accessible to
the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner.
State Budget Processes
Can the legislature provide input to the state budget?
In law, the legislature can amend the budget.
In practice, significant public expenditures (defined as any project costing more than
1% of the total state budget) require legislative approval.
In practice, the legislature has sufficient capacity to monitor the budget process and
provide input or changes.
Can citizens access the state budgetary process?
In practice, the state budgetary process is conducted in a transparent manner in the
debating stage (i.e. before final approval).
In practice, citizens provide input at budget hearings.
In practice, citizens can access itemized budget allocations.
In law, is there a separate legislative committee which provides oversight of public
funds.
Is the legislative committee overseeing the expenditure of public funds effective?
In practice, department heads regularly submit reports to this committee.
In practice, the committee acts in a non-partisan manner with members of
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opposition parties serving on the committee in an equitable fashion.
In practice, when necessary, this committee initiates independent investigations into
financial irregularities.
Are budget information and related records made available to citizens?
Does the state executive publish a pre-budget statement, which presents the
assumptions used in developing the budget such as the expected revenue,
expenditure, debt-levels, and broad allocations among sectors?
Does the state executive publish its budget proposal, which presents the state
government's detailed declaration of policies and priorities for the upcoming budget
year?
Does the state legislature publish an enacted budget document that authorizes the
executive to implement the policy measures outlined in the budget?
Does the state executive publish monthly or quarterly in-year reports on revenues
collected, expenditures made, and debt incurred?
Does the state executive publish a mid-year review for the first six months of the
budget year to discuss any changes in economic assumptions that would affect
approved budget policies?
Does the state executive issue a year-end report summarizing the financial situation
at the end of the fiscal year?
Does the state publish an annual audit report, produced by an entity independent
from the executive, which covers the activities undertaken by the executive during
the fiscal year?
Does the state publish a citizens budget containing non-technical budget
information that is accessible to a broader audience?
Do reports issued by the state contain information on tax expenditures (information
on on tax credits, deductions, and exemptions that reduce state revenue)?
Does the state have a well-resourced fiscal budget office for the non-partisan
analysis of budget proposals?
In law, there is a state fiscal budget office to provide fiscal notes and nonpartisan
analysis on the costs and benefits of every bill and budget proposal.
In practice, the state fiscal budget office has sufficient capacity to provide quality
analysis in line with its mandate.
State Civil Service Management
Are there regulations for the state civil service encompassing, at least, the
managerial and professional staff?
In law, there are regulations requiring an impartial, independent, and fairly
managed state civil service.
In law, there are regulations to prevent nepotism (favorable treatment of family
members), cronyism (favorable treatment of friends and colleagues), or patronage
(favorable treatment of those who reward their superiors) within the civil service.
In law, there is an independent redress mechanism for the civil service.
In law, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future state
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government employment.
Is the law governing the administration and civil service effective?
In practice, state civil servants are protected from political interference.
In practice, civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional
criteria.
In practice, civil service management actions (e.g. hiring, firing, promotions) are not
based on nepotism, cronyism, or patronage.
In practice, civil servants have clear job descriptions.
In practice, civil servant bonuses constitute only a small fraction of total pay.
In practice, the government publishes the number of authorized civil service
positions along with the number of positions actually filled.
In practice, the independent redress mechanism for the civil service is effective.
In practice, civil servants convicted of corruption are prohibited from future
government employment.
Are there regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants?
In law, senior members of the state civil service are required to file an asset
disclosure form.
In law, there are requirements for civil servants to recuse themselves from policy
decisions where their personal interests may be affected.
In law, there are restrictions for civil servants entering the private sector after
leaving the government.
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants.
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure
forms of senior members of the state civil service.
Are the regulations addressing conflicts of interest for civil servants effective?
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment
for civil servants are effective.
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to civil servants
are effective.
In practice, the requirements for civil service recusal from policy decisions affecting
personal interests are effective.
In practice, civil service asset disclosures are audited.
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants?
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants.
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil
servants within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of senior state civil
servants at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants are of high
quality.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of senior state civil servants are accessible to
the public online in a meaningful and accessible manner.
Are state employees protected from recrimination or other negative consequences
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when reporting corruption (i.e. whistle-blowing)?
In law, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or abuse
of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
In practice, civil servants who report cases of corruption, graft, abuse of power, or
abuse of resources are protected from recrimination or other negative consequences.
In law, is there an internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local
office) through which civil servants can report corruption.
In practice, is the internal mechanism (i.e. phone hotline, e-mail address, local
office) through which civil servants can report corruption effective?
In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption has a
professional, full-time staff.
In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption receives
regular funding.
In practice, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector corruption acts on
complaints within a reasonable time period.
In practice, when necessary, the internal reporting mechanism for public sector
corruption initiates investigations.
Procurement
Is the public procurement process effective?
In law, there are regulations addressing conflicts of interest for public procurement
officials.
In law, there is mandatory professional training for public procurement officials.
In practice, the conflicts of interest regulations for public procurement officials are
enforced.
In law, there is a mechanism that monitors the assets, incomes, and spending habits
of public procurement officials.
In law, major procurements require competitive bidding.
In law, strict formal requirements limit the extent of "sole sourcing."
In law, rules exist to avoid "pay to play" conflicts in public procurement.
In practice, "pay to play" rules are effectively enforced.
In law, unsuccessful bidders can initiate an official review of procurement decisions.
In law, unsuccessful bidders can challenge procurement decisions in a court of law.
In law, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e. bribery)
are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.
In practice, companies guilty of major violations of procurement regulations (i.e.
bribery) are prohibited from participating in future procurement bids.
In law, there are regulations governing the the conduct of state service contractors.
In practice, the regulations governing the conduct of state service contractors are
effective.
Can citizens access the public procurement process?
In law, citizens can access public procurement regulations.
In law, the state government is required to publicly announce the results of
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procurement decisions.
In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations (the rules governing
the competitive procurement process) within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access public procurement regulations (the rules governing
the competitive procurement process) at a reasonable cost.
In practice, major public procurements are effectively advertised.
In practice, citizens can access the results of major public procurement bids.
In practice, the results of major procurement bids are accessible to the public online
in a meaningful and accessible manner.
Internal Auditing
Is there an audit institution or equivalent agency covering the entire state's public
sector?
In law, is there an audit institution, auditor general, or equivalent agency covering
the entire state's public sector.
Is the supreme audit institution effective?
In law, the audit institution is protected from political interference.
In practice, the head of the audit agency is protected from removal without relevant
justification.
In practice, the audit agency has a professional, full-time staff.
In practice, audit agency appointments support the independence of the agency.
In practice, the audit agency receives regular funding.
In practice, the audit agency makes regular public reports.
In practice, the government acts on the findings of the audit agency.
In practice, the audit agency is able to initiate its own investigations.
Can citizens access reports of the supreme audit institution?
In law, citizens can access reports of the audit agency.
In practice, citizens can access audit reports within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access the audit reports at a reasonable cost.
In practice, audit reports are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and
accessible manner.
Lobbying Disclosure
Is there a clear definition of a lobbyist in the state?
In law, the definition of lobbyist recognizes executive branch lobbyists as well as
legislative lobbyists.
In law, lobbyists are defined on the basis of monetary thresholds specifying
spending and/or compensation levels.
In practice, the definition of a lobbyist tied to spending and/or compensation levels
from lobbying activities effectively captures lobbyists' activity in the state.
Are lobbyists required to register with the state?
In law, lobbyists are required to file a registration form.
In practice, registrations are filed within a reasonable time period of initial lobbying
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activity.
In practice, lobbyists' registration information is comprehensive and of high quality.
In law, lobbyists are required to file registrations annually.
Are lobbyists required to disclose spending?
In law, lobbyists are required to file a spending report.
In practice, lobbyists' spending reports are filed with reasonable frequency.
In law, lobbyists report compensation/salary on spending reports.
In practice, the spending reports are comprehensive and of high quality.
Are lobbyists' employers or principals required to disclose spending?
In law, employers or principals of lobbyists are required to fill out spending reports.
In practice, employers/principals list the compensation/salary of any lobbyists they
hire on spending reports.
Can citizens access the information reported from lobbyists to the state
government?
In practice, citizens can access lobbying disclosure documents (including
registration, expenses, and compensation reports) within a reasonable time period.
In practice, citizens can access lobbying disclosure documents at a reasonable cost.
In practice, lobbying disclosure documents are accessible to the public online in a
meaningful and accessible manner.
Is there effective monitoring of lobbying disclosure requirements?
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of lobbying disclosure
records when irregularities are uncovered.
In practice, the independent auditing of lobbying disclosure records is effective.
In practice, when necessary, the state imposes penalties on offenders who violate
lobbying disclosure and reporting requirements.
State Pension Fund Management
Are there laws and regulations requiring that state-run pension funds be managed
transparently?
In law, there is an independent public redress mechanism for members of boards
and management of the state-run pension funds.
In law, state-run pension funds are required to publicly disclose information about
their investment activities.
In law, there are regulations governing the activity of placement agents, or hired
third parties used by investment firms to secure business with state-run pension
funds.
In law, placement agents, or hired third parties used by investment firms to secure
business with state-run pension funds, are required to disclose all fees and terms
retained for providing “finder” or introduction services.
In law, placement agents, or hired third parties used by investment firms to secure
business with state-run pension funds, are required to register with the state.
Are the laws and regulations requiring that state-run pension funds be managed
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transparently effective?
In practice, the state-run pension funds have sufficient staff and resources with
which to fulfill their mandate.
In practice, members of boards and management of the state-run pension funds are
appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.
In practice, members of boards and management of the state-run pension funds are
protected from political interference.
In practice, the state-run pension funds disclose information about their investment
and financial activity in a transparent manner.
In practice, the investment decisions governing the portfolio of state-run pension
funds are not concentrated in a single individual's hands.
In practice, regulations governing the activity of placement agents, or hired third
parties used by investment firms to secure business with state-run pension funds,
are effective.
In practice, private entities manage portions of state-run pension funds in a
transparent manner.
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest of members of the board or the
management of the state run pension funds?
In law, members of boards and management of the state run pension funds are
required to file regular asset disclosure forms.
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of
boards and management of the state-run pension funds.
In law, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of boards and
management of the state-run pension funds.
In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure
forms of members of boards and management of the state-run pension funds.
In law, there are restrictions on members of boards and management of the state-run
pension funds entering the private sector after leaving the office.
In practice, regulations governing conflicts of interest of members of the board or
the management of the state-run pension funds are effective?
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of
boards and management of the state-run pension funds are effective.
In practice, asset disclosures of members of boards and management of the state-run
pension funds are audited.
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of boards
and management of the state-run pension funds within a reasonable time period.
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of boards
and management of the state-run pension funds at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of boards and management of
the state-run pension funds are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and
accessible manner.
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment
for members of boards and management of the state-run pension funds are effective.
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Ethics Enforcement Agencies
Are there laws and regulations to promote and protect a professional ethics
enforcement agency (or set of agencies)?
In law, there is an agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules.
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules has an
independently allocated budget for its activities.
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules can
independently initiate investigations into alleged violations of state ethics
rules/regulations.
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules can
impose penalties on individuals found in violation of state ethics rules/regulations.
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules can
propose the creation of relevant laws or regulations to bolster its mission.
In law, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules has
jurisdiction across all branches of the state government.
Are the laws and regulations to promote and protect a professional ethics
enforcement agency (or set of agencies) effective?
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules has
sufficient staff and resources.
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state
ethics rules are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.
In practice, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state
ethics rules are protected from political interference.
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules
independently initiates investigations into alleged violations of state ethics
rules/regulations.
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules
imposes penalties on offenders.
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules
proposes the creation of relevant laws or regulations to bolster its mission.
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules
monitors all branches of the state government in an effective manner.
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules
accepts all complaints brought before it.
In practice, the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules
accepts complaints from anonymous complainants.
Are there regulations governing conflicts of interest by the ethics enforcement
agencies?
In law, members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics
rules are required to file regular asset disclosure forms.
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to the members
of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules.
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In law, there are requirements for the independent auditing of the asset disclosure
forms of members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics
rules.
Are the regulations governing conflicts of interest by the ethics enforcement agencies
effective?
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to members of the
agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are effective.
In practice, asset disclosures of members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with
enforcing state ethics rules are audited.
In law, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of the agency
or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules.
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of the
agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules within a reasonable
time period.
In practice, the public can access the asset disclosure records of members of the
agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the agency or set of agencies
tasked with enforcing state ethics rules are accessible to the public online in a
meaningful and accessible manner.
In law, there are restrictions on members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with
enforcing state ethics rules entering the private sector after leaving the office.
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment
for members of the agency or set of agencies tasked with enforcing state ethics rules
are effective.
State Insurance Commissions
Is the state insurance commission protected from political and special interest
influence?
In law, there are requirements for members of the board and senior staff of the state
insurance commission to recuse themselves from policy decisions where their
personal interests may be affected.
In law, the members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission
are protected from political interference.
In practice, the the members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance
commission are protected from political interference.
In practice, the head of the members of the board and senior staff of the state
insurance commission are protected from removal without relevant justification.
Does the state insurance commission have sufficient capacity to carry out its
mandate?
In practice, the state insurance commission has a professional, full-time staff.
In practice, the state insurance commission receives regular funding.
Are there conflicts of interest regulations covering members of the board and senior
staff of the state insurance commission?
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In law, there are restrictions on the members of the board and senior staff of the state
insurance commission entering the private sector after leaving the government.
In law, members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission are
required to file regular asset disclosure forms.
In law, there are regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to the members
of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission.
Are the conflicts of interest regulations covering members of the board and senior
staff of the state insurance commission effective?
In practice, the regulations governing gifts and hospitality offered to the members of
the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission are effective.
In practice, the regulations restricting post-government private sector employment
for the members of the board and senior staff of the state insurance commission are
effective.
Can citizens access the asset disclosure records of the state insurance commission?
In law, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the the members of the
board and senior staff of the state insurance commission
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the the members of the
board and senior staff of the state insurance commission within a reasonable time
period.
In practice, citizens can access the asset disclosure records of the members of the
board and senior staff of the state insurance commission at a reasonable cost.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of the members of the board and senior staff
of the state insurance commission are of high quality.
In practice, the asset disclosure records of members of the board and senior staff of
the state insurance commission are accessible to the public online in a meaningful
and accessible manner.
In practice, asset disclosures for members of the state insurance commission are
audited.
Does the state insurance commission publicly disclose documents filed by insurance
companies?
In law, the state insurance commission is required to publicly disclose all documents
filed by insurance companies with the agency.
In practice, the state insurance commission publicly discloses all documents filed by
insurance companies with the agency.
In practice, the publicly available documents filed by insurance companies with the
state insurance commission are accessible to the public online in a meaningful and
accessible manner.
In practice, meeting minutes and/or summaries of decisions made by the state
insurance commission are publicly available.
Redistricting
Is the state redistricting process open and transparent?
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, public meetings were or are being held
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on the redistricting process.
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, public hearings were or are being held
to solicit input on new district maps.
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, schedules of these meeting and/or
hearings were or are available to the public.
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, the state government accepted or is
accepting redistricting plans submitted by the public.
In practice, for the latest redistricting round, the government made or is making a
redistricting website or online source of redistricting information available to the
public.

The confidence gap represents a scenario where the public cannot distinguish between
whether any public institutions are better, worse, or simply different than others.
ii Proper names of commissions and empowering statutes are available at:
http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/state-ethics-commissions.aspx
iii Factor analysis using ordinal responses is fairly common practice, even though one
of the assumptions of factor analysis is linearity in the parameters. This was my
reason for using the polychoric factor analysis as my means of testing for dimension
reduction – an approach typically not used in the public administration literature.
iv Note that the model using Budget per Monitored and Staff per Monitored provided
lower AICs than the alternative models: 376.802 was the lowest AIC for the
Governor’s model and 372.527 was the lowest AIC for the Legislature’s model.
v The Michigan respondent answered affirmatively to question 1 but not question 2.
Per the National Council of State Legislatures (2014), Michigan’s commission does
not have the authority to levy sanctions.
i
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